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MADOFF PONZI SCHEME EXPOSES 
"THE MYTH OF THE SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR" 
Felicia Smith * 
ABSTRACT 
On June 29,2009, Bernard L. Madoffwas sentenced to 150 years 
in a federal penitentiary for his role in a multinational Ponzi scheme 
of historic proportions-some $64.8 billion (which included 
estimated gains from apparently bogus investment returns). The 
criminal charges against Madoff included securities fraud, 
investment adviser fraud, international and domestic money 
laundering, and perjury. 
Many of Madoff's investors were regarded as sophisticated 
investors. Since its adoption in 1933, the Securities Act affords an 
exemption from the registration requirements for issuers who offer 
securities to sophisticated investors because these investors have the 
resources and financial expertise to obtain access to, and evaluate, 
disclosures concerning the offering they deem significant for their 
respective investment decisions. Thus, the federal statute recognizes 
that because sophisticated investors "can fend for themselves, " they 
do not require the protections that the registration provisions are 
designed to provide. 
At the very least, sophisticated investors would have been 
expected to act in their own interests and would have had the means 
to do so. Then why did so many sophisticated investors-institutional 
and individual-fall prey to Madoff's fraud? Were these institutions 
and individuals unable to fend for themselves, or in the face of 
reports that Madoff strongly discouraged questions, were they simply 
unwilling to fend for themselves? If sophisticated investors cannot 
(or will not) fend for themselves, is there any rationale for continuing 
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to view the private offering transaction as one for which there is "no 
practical need" for registration or for which "the public benefits are 
too remote?" 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1933, federal law has regulated the offering of securities to 
the public. The purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 1 (Securities 
Act) is to "provide full and fair disclosure of the character of 
securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce ... and to prevent 
frauds in the sale" of securities. 2 This is accomplished principally by 
requiring registration of offerings of securities to the public with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission). 3 
Congress also exempted particular securities and specific 
transactions from the registration regime because it determined that 
there is "no practical need" for registration or "the public benefits are 
too remote.,,4 One of the transaction exemptions is set forth in 
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, which permits an issuer to 
privately offer its securities to purchasers who are "sophisticated 
investors.,,5 The investors to whom private offerings may be made 
are considered to be sophisticated investors because they have the 
resources and financial expertise to obtain access to, and evaluate, 
information concerning the offering they deem significant for their 
respective investment decisions and investment objectives. 6 Thus, 
they are considered to have the wherewithal to "fend for 
themselves.',7 
In 2009, Bernard L. Madoff (Madoff), a former Chairman of the 
NASDAQ Stock Market and principal of Bernard L. Madoff 
Investment Securities, LLC,8 pled guilty to defrauding investors of an 
l. Securities Act ofl933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (2006). 
2. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38,48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.c. § 77a-aa 
(2006)). 
3. 15 U.S.c. § 77f(a). 
4. H.R. REp. No. 73-85, at 5 (1933) (Conf. Rep.). 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (exempting "transactions by an issuer not involving any public 
offering"). The issuer, however, bears the burden of establishing that the exemption is 
available for its private offering transaction given the "broadly remedial purposes" of 
the statute. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953). 
6. See Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 125-27. 
7. ld. at 125. 
8. Information at ~ 3, United States v. Madoff, No. 09-cr-213-DC (S.D.N.Y. 2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoffl2009031 Ocriminalinfo.pdf; 
Transcript of Plea Proceeding at 23, United States v. Madoff, No. 09-cr-213-DC 
(S.D.N.Y.), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoffl 
madofihearing031209.pdf (Plea Allocution of Bernard L. Madofi). Madoff formerly 
was Chairman of London-based Madoff Securities International, Ltd. and a Director 
of Cohrnad Securities Corporation. Broker Check Report: Bernard Lawrence Madoff, 
FlNRA, 4, http://www.finra.orgllnvestors/ToolsCalculators/BrokerCheck (select 
"START SEARCH"; click box to agree to "Terms and Conditions"; click 
"CONTINUE"; enter "Bernard Madotr', select "Broker", and click "START 
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estimated $64.8 billion (an estimate that included gains from 
apparently bogus "investment retums,,).9 Among Madoffs investors 
were hedge fund managers, charities, pension funds, retirees, 
celebrities, and self-described "average Americans."io Those with 
the greatest exposure to Madoff had invested amounts ranging from 
millions to billions of dollars. ii 
As a result of their wealth or expertise in financial or business 
matters, Madoff s investors would have been considered 
sophisticated investors. i2 How, then, does one explain the presence 
of so many sophisticated investors-institutional and individual-
SEARCH"; enter characters in box for BrokerCheck authentication and click 
"Continue"; click "Bernard Lawrence Madoff (316687)"; click "Get Detailed 
Report") (last updated Jui. 18,2010). 
9. Compare Information, supra note 8, at ~ 14 (noting the total balance of the client 
accounts managed by Madoft), with Plea Allocution of Bernard L. Madoff at I, 3, 
United States v. Madoff, 626 F. Supp. 2d 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-cr-213-DC), 
2009 WL 622150 (Madoff's guilty plea). The Commission had obtained equitable 
and certain other relief in civil proceedings instituted against Madoff. Madoff 
Consents to Partial Judgment Imposing Permanent Injunction and Continuing Other 
Relief, Litigation Release No. 20889, 95 SEC Docket 564 (Feb. 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20889.htm (showing that Madoff was 
enjoined from future violations of "Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section lO(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule IOb-5 there under, and Sections 
206( 1) and 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940"); SEC Obtains 
Preliminary Injunction, Asset Freeze, and Other Relief Against Defendants, Litigation 
Release No. 20834, 94 SEC Docket 3091 (Dec. 19, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20834.htm. Subsequently, the 
Commission announced that on June 16, 2009, it had permanently barred Madoff 
from the securities industry. SEC News Digest (Issue 2009-115), SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM'N (June 17, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/digestl2009/dig061709.htm. 
10. Transmittal Letter and Exhibits at 32-33, United States v. Madoff, 626 F. Supp. 2d 
420 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-cr-213-DC), EFC No. 85 (statement of wife and 
husband who had invested in a Madoff feeder fund). 
11. See Madoff's Victims, WALL ST. 1. (Mar. 6, 2009), http://s.wsj.netlpublic/resources/ 
documents/st_ madofC victims _20081215.html (listing prominent customers and 
others with large exposures to Madoffs fraud). 
12. For purposes of this article, the term sophisticated investors also encompass 
"accredited investors" within the meaning of rule 501(a) of Regulation D under the 
Securities Act. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2009). Accreditation is a concept the 
Commission initially created to obviate the uncertainty arising from a requirement 
that an issuer make a "subjective determination" concerning an offeree or purchaser's 
sophistication or financial condition. Under former Rule 146, an issuer would 
determine a particular purchaser's eligibility to participate in an offering by reference 
to the rule's objective standards for accredited persons. Exemption of Limited Offers 
and Sales by Qualified Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6180,45 Fed. Reg. 6362, 
6363 (Jan. 28, 1980) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 and 239). 
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among Madoffs clientele? Why did they fall prey to Madoffs 
fraud? Were these institutions and individuals unable to fend for 
themselves, or in the face of reports that Madoff strongly discouraged 
questions, were they simply unwilling to fend for themselves? At the 
very least, sophisticated investors would have been expected to act in 
their own interests and would have had the means to do so. 
Did the behavior of these sophisticated investors represent the 
typical diligence in private offerings (even if written policies and 
procedures established a more formal structure), or was this an 
aberration-a lapse in discipline by sophisticated investors that is 
unlikely to be repeated? If sophisticated investors cannot (or will 
not) fend for themselves, is there any rationale for continuing to view 
the private offering transaction as one for which there is "no practical 
need" for registration or for which "the public benefits are too 
remote"? 13 
Numerous investors, particularly elderly retirees, are now reported 
to have "lost" everything. 14 The Madoff fraud also has affected 
persons and communities who rely on philanthropic entities. 15 These 
entities have shuttered their doors-or have had to curtail 
significantly their activities-because the funds on which they relied 
to perform their essential charitable roles in their respective 
communities have been dissipated. 
In light of these developments, policy makers should re-examine 
the wisdom of continued reliance on the statutory model that leaves 
sophisticated investors to fend for themselves. 
Part I summarizes the criminal charges to which Madoff pled guilty 
and the impact of Madoffs fraud on his investors. Madoffs fraud 
13. H.R. REp. No. 73-85, at 5 (1933) (Conf. Rep.). 
14. See, e.g., Transmittal Letter and Exhibits, supra note 10. 
15. See Eleanor Laise & Dennis K. Berman, Impact on Jewish Charities Is Catastrophic, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2008, at A20, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB122933474726606471 (noting that MadotT and many of his clients were major 
contributors to charities); see also Mike Spector, Bear Market for Charities, WALL ST. 
1., Jan. 24, 2009, at Al (financial crisis and MadotT fraud have adverse impact on 
Harlem Children's Zone's donor base); Andrea James, MadofJ Scandal Felt in State: 
Area Foundations Among at Least 16 Victims in Region, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCE 
(Feb. 5, 2009, 9:10 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/business1398977_madoffwa06. 
htmI (funding for a Seattle-area "social justice project" was imperiled due to reliance 
on donors who were Madoffinvestors); Brooke Masters & Joanna Chung, Big MadofJ 
Investors Targeted, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2009, 19:18), http://www.ft.coml 
cms/s/3b5c320e-0368-11 de-h405-000077b07658,dwp _ uuid=24032e94 (at least 200 
charities are reported to have invested with Madoff); Weisel Foundation Loses Nearly 
Everything in MadofJ Scheme, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2009, 1:04 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI23017956665533701.html(''Many Jewish charities 
invested with Mr. MadotT, and some have had to close their doors."). 
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also had an adverse impact on investors' confidence in the markets 
and in market regulators. Part II presents the legislative history and 
scope of the private offering exemption, which effectively functions 
as a proxy for federal oversight of the transaction because the 
exemption relies on sophisticated investors to fend for themselves in 
lieu of issuer compliance with federally mandated offering 
disclosures. Part II also summarizes regulatory initiatives that are 
designed to provide greater certainty concerning which particular 
investors would satisfy the eligibility requirements to participate in 
transactions that rely on the private offering exemption. The 
limitations of the private offering exemption as illustrated by the 
Madoff Ponzi scheme are discussed in Part III. Even though the 
statutory exemption works reasonably well with a discrete class of 
sophisticated investors, Part IV addresses the policy and regulatory 
challenges of providing access to privately offered investments to a 
broad spectrum of individual accredited investors. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Bernard L. Madoff, who was charged with conducting a 
multinational, multibillion-dollar Ponzi scheme,16 pled guilty to an 
16. In his statement before the court in March, Madoff testified that he had perpetrated a 
Ponzi scheme. Plea Allocution of Bernard L. Madoff, supra note 8, at 23 ("As I 
engaged in my fraud, I knew what I was doing was wrong, indeed criminal."). 
According to the Associated Press, forty Ponzi schemes collapsed in 2008, compared 
to 150 in 2009. Curt Anderson, Ponzi Schemes' Col/apses Nearly Quadrupled in '09, 
LAW.COM (Dec. 29, 2009), http://www.law.comJjsp/law/LawArtic\eFriendly.jsp? 
id=1202437299784. The Ponzi scheme is the quintessential application of the 
proverb "to rob Peter to pay Paul." 3 JOHN WYCLlFE, The Seven Werkys of Mercy 
Bodyly, in MISCELLANEOUS WORKS 174 (Thomas Arnold ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 
1871), available at http://files.libertyfund.org/filesI1474/0743-03_Bk.pdf ("Lord, hou 
schul de God approve [th]at [th]ou robbe Petur, and gif [th]is robbere to Poule in [th]e 
name of Crist?"); OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 101 (2d ed. 1989); JOHN BARTLETT, 
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 160 (Emily Morrison Beck & Little Brown & Co. eds. 15th 
ed. 1980) (attributed to John Heywood). 
The eponymous Ponzi scheme originated as a fraudulent investment program 
perpetrated by Charles Ponzi, who induced thousands in the 1920s to invest in an 
arbitrage program in which Ponzi bought depreciated European currencies (e.g., 
Italian Lire and French Francs), and used the proceeds to buy International 
Correspondence Reply Coupons issued by the particular European government. Ponzi 
purportedly derived his investment returns by cashing the Coupons at their par value. 
C. W. Barron Skeptical About "Exchange Wizard", WALL ST. 1., July 30, 1920, at 2, 
available at http://online.wsj.comJpublic/resources/documents/wSJ-ponzi-07301920. 
pdf. Ponzi's scheme ultimately relied on infusions of cash from new investors to pay 
the promised "investment returns" to current investors. Clarence W. Barron had 
critically noted that "[r]ight under the nose of Government officials [Charles Ponzi] is 
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eleven-count criminal information,I7 which leveled charges of 
securities fraud, investment adviser fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, 
three counts of international or domestic money laundering, false 
statements, perjury, false filings with the Commission, and theft from 
an employee benefit plan against him.I8 
While Madoff acknowledged culpability for his crimes,19 given the 
magnitude and breadth of his Ponzi scheme, the possibility that he 
acted alone seems implausible. 20 Indeed, the Government has 
paying United States money to one line of depositors from deposits made by a 
succeeding line." Id. As long as the promoter of a Ponzi scheme can raise sufficient 
amounts of new investment funds--or limit withdrawals of funds from current 
investors-the fraud can continue. However, when the promoter can no longer recruit 
new investors or raise new capital from which to payout investment returns or make 
redemptions, the fraudulent nature of the program becomes manifest. See Finra 
Investment Alert-Avoiding Investment Scams, FINRA, at I, available at 
http://www.finra.orgllnvestors/ProtectYourselflInvestorAlertsIFraudsAndScamsIP118 
010 (last updated Aug. 31, 2009) ("[I]nvestors in a Ponzi scheme typically do not 
have to recruit new investors to earn a share of 'profits'."); see also Stephen 
Greenspan, Why We Keep Falling/or Financial Scams, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2009, at 
WI, available at http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SBI23093987596650 197 .html 
("Simply stated, the fact that so many people seem to be making big profits on the 
investment, and telling others about their good fortune, makes the investment seem 
safe and too good to pass up."). 
17. One consequence of his guilty plea was that any Madoff property that constituted (or 
may be derived from) the fruits of certain criminal offenses (i.e., securities fraud, mail 
fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and theft from an employee benefit plan) was 
subject to forfeiture to the Government of the United States. Information, supra note 
8, ~~ 42-44. Madofl' was remanded into custody after entering his guilty plea. Robert 
Frank et aI., Madoff Jailed After Admitting Epic Scam, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13,2009, at 
AI. The Commission previously had announced that it had obtained equitable and 
certain other relief in civil proceedings instituted against Madofl'. Litigation Release 
No. 20889, supra note 9 (announcing that Madofl' was enjoined from future violations 
of "Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section lOeb) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 and rule IOb-5 thereunder, and Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940"); Litigation Release No. 20834, supra note 9. Subsequently, 
the Commission announced that on June 16,2009, it had permanently barred Madofl' 
from the securities industry. SEC News Digest (Issue 2009-115), supra note 9. 
18. Information, supra note 8. The Government and Madoff did not enter into a plea 
agreement. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Bernard L. Madoff Charged in Eleven-
Count Criminal Information (Mar. 14, 2009), available at http://www,justice.gov/ 
usao/nys/pressreleases/March09/madoffbernardinformationpr.pdf. 
19. Plea. Allocution of Bernard L. Madofl', supra note 8, at 30 ("Your Honor, I hope I 
have conveyed with some particularity in my own words, the crimes I committed and 
the means by which I committed them."). 
20. Joanna Chung & Brooke Masters, Fury at Madoff Over Claim He Acted Alone, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Mar. 13, 2009, at 16 (noting that because Madoff was not charged 
with conspiracy, he was not required to identify any co-conspirators.); The Madoff 
Affair: Going Down Quietly, ECONOMIST (Mar. 12, 2009) http://www.economist.com/ 
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continued to investigate the Madofffraud21 and to assert its belief that 
Madoff conducted his fraudulent scheme since at least the early 
1980s. 22 
In a collateral development, Mrs. Ruth Madoff, Madoff's wife, 
agreed to surrender her ownership interest in certain property she 
owned individually23 or held jointly with her husband. 24 Prosecutors 
node/13278976 ("Few believe that he acted alone, but identifying those who colluded, 
and how, is proving difficult."). 
21. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Bernard MadoffSentenced to 150 Years in Prison 
(June 29, 2009), available at http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressreI09/ 
nyfo062909.htm. On August 11,2009, Frank DiPascali, Jr., a senior manager for the 
investment advisory business conducted by BLMIS, pled guilty to ten criminal counts 
for his role in perpetrating the Madoff Ponzi scheme. Transcript of Plea Proceeding at 
65, United States v. DiPascali, No. 09-CR-764-(RJS) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoffJdipascaliplea81109.pdf; see also. 
Information at 1,33-39,43,47, United States v. DiPascali, No. 09-CR-764 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoffJ20090811 
dipascaliinformationsigned.pdf (announcing the criminal information charging 
DiPascali with ten counts, including conspiracy to commit securities and investment 
adviser fraud, falsifying the books and records of a registered broker-dealer and a 
registered investment adviser, and international money laundering). On November 3, 
2009, the Government also charged David G. Friehling, BLMIS' auditor, with 
multiple criminal counts. Information at 1, 9-10, United States v. Friehling, No. 09-
Cr.-700-(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/friehling davids 1 information. pdf The 
Government accepted Friehling's plea agreement. See Plea Agreement at 1-6, United 
States v. Friehling, No. 09-Cr.-700-(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/friehlingdavidplea agreement.pdf 
22. Government's Sentencing Memorandum at 2, United States v. Madoff, 626 F. Supp. 
2d 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) No. 09-Cr.-213-(DC), 2009 WL 1899501, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ nys/madoffJ20090626sentencingmemorandumfiled.pdf 
The Wall Street Jaurnal reported that the "core trading business on which Mr. Madoff 
built his reputation suffered in recent years as the investment-advisory business ... 
grew to be a much bigger part of the company." Aaron Lucchetti, Madoff's Traders 
Were In Decline, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15,2009, at CI. 
23. See Amir Efrati, The Madaff Fraud Case: Assets af Madaffs Wife in Focus, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 3, 2009, at CIO, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI236050 
10820616231.html (reporting that Madoff's Upper East Side apartment in Manhattan, 
and homes in the Hamptons and Palm Beach, Florida were held solely in Ruth 
Madoff's name). 
24. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Bernard L. Madoff Ordered to Forfeit Over $170 
Billion; Government Settles Claims of Ruth Madoff Against Forfeited Property (June 
26,2009), available at http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressreI09/nyfo062609.htm. 
Judge Chin's forfeiture order divested Madoff of his interest in real or personal 
property held individually or jointly. Id. Ruth Madoff surrendered her interest in the 
following property: (1) accounts at Cohrnad Securities Corporation and Wachovia 
Bank, N.A. valued at approximately $59.7 million; (2) the Upper East Side apartment 
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agreed not to pursue criminal charges against her. 25 Initially, the 
Madoffs sought to characterize about $70 million of their assets as 
"untainted" by Madoffs fraud;26 however, Mrs. Madoff ultimately 
was allowed to retain about $2.5 million in cash purportedly 
unrelated to Madoffs fraud. 27 
In a subsequent action, Irving L. Picard (the Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation (SIPC) Trustee appointed for Bernard L. 
Madoff Investment Securities, LLC (BLMIS)) alleged that the 
transfers to Mrs. Madoff-or to entities she controlled or in which 
she had an interest-were fraudulent conveyances. 28 Seeking to 
recover approximately $44.8 million for the benefit of Madoffs 
defrauded investors,29 Picard explained that his action was driven by 
"[t]he inequity between Mrs. Madoffs continuing financial 
advantages and the economic distress of Madoffs customers.,,30 
Picard filed lawsuits to "recover $10.1 billion in fictitious profits 
paid out by BLMIS," the proceeds of which would be used "to satisfy 
in Manhattan and homes in the Hamptons and Palm Beach valued at approximately 
$22.95 million; (3) $1.4 million in proceeds from the sale of the Madoffs' home in 
Cap d' Antibes, France; (4) furniture, artwork, electronics and appliances, jewelry, 
apparel, and all other insured or saleable personal property in the Madoffs' residences 
in New York State, Florida, and France; and (5) "tens of millions of dollars of loans" 
the Madoffs' made to their family, friends, and employees. Id. 
25. See Amir Efrati, The Madoff Fraud: Evidence to Charge Ruth Madoff Lacking, WALL 
ST. J., July 2, 2009, at C4, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1246460 
53786080327.html ("Federal investigators have concluded for now there is no 
physical evidence that Ruth Madoff . . . actively participated in or concealed her 
husband's fraud."). 
26. Efrati, supra note 23 at CIO; see also Federal Authorities Seize Madoff's Florida 
Home, Two Boats in Latest Effort to Claim Assets, FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. I, 2009), 
http://www.foxnews.comlprinter_friendly-story/0.3566.512058.00.html(reporting 
that of the $31.55 million in loans the Madoffs made to their sons Andrew and Mark, 
approximately $4.5 million of loans were made to Andrew "less than three months 
before Madoff admitted to [Andrew and Mark] that his investment business was a 
complete fraud"). 
27. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note 24 (reporting that Mrs. Madoff's assets 
continue to be subject to the claims of private litigants, or of other governmental 
entities). 
28. SIPC Trustee Sues Ruth Madoff: Seeks Recapture of $45 Million of Customers' 
Money She Receivedfrom Husband in the Last Six Years, SEC. INVESTOR PROT. CORP. 
(July 29,2009), http://www.sipc.org/mediairelease29July09.cfm. 
29. Id. ("Mr. Picard states that 'while Madoff's crimes have left many investors 
impoverished and some charities decimated, Mrs. Madoff remains a person of 
substantial means. "'). 
30. Id. 
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valid BLMIS customer claims."3l Although Picard decided not to 
seek recovery of funds distributed to Madoff investors who suffered a 
net loss from the fraud,32 certain investors whose distributions from 
Madoff exceeded their contributions may resist the SIPC Trustee's 
calls for them to return their Madoff distributions. 33 According to 
Picard, "Due to the fact that every customer statement was fiction, 
the first task was to reconstruct the books and records of BLMIS 
from scratch.,,34 Already it is apparent that there were no "profits" in 
the customers' fictitious account statements, but a number of these 
investors reportedly want them anyway. 35 In 2010, U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court Judge Burton Lifland ruled in Picard's favor when he 
31. SIPC: $61 Million in Commitments Made to Madoff Claimants, with $100 Million 
Level Expected to Be Reached by Memorial Day, SEC. INVESTOR PROT. CORP. (May 
14, 2009), http://www.sipc.org/mediaireleaseI4May09.cfm. 
32. Amir Efrati, Madoff's Net Losers Safe From Clawbacks, WALL ST. 1., Apr. 24, 2009, 
at C8. 
33. Jane J. Kim, As 'C/awback' Suits Loom, Some Investors Seek Cover, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 12, 2009, at C3, available at http://online.wsj.comiarticle/SBI236815 
86212702121.html ("[So-called clawback] suits ... are prompting some investors to 
protect their remaining assets by transferring them to irrevocable trusts, homes, 
annuities, or life-insurance policies, according to attorneys."); SIPC: $61 Million in 
Commitments Made to Madoff Claimants, with $100 Million Level Expected to Be 
Reached by Memorial Day, supra note 31 ("Picard added: 'I have a statutory duty to 
treat fairly all BLMIS customers and part of that duty requires pulling together the 
largest possible fund of customer property from which to make payments. This 
includes the duty to investigate, and, where appropriate, go to court to recover from 
persons or entities who received more than their share. In actual fact, persons who are 
subject to these recovery efforts actually received money stolen from others. 
Congress specifically requires that these funds must be returned so that all customers 
share equally. "'); Associated Press, 'Victims' of Madoff Scandal Do Math, Realize 
They Profited, FOXNEWS (Jan. 9, 2009), www.foxnews.comiprinter_friendly_story/ 
0,3566,478326,00.html ("The many Bernard Madoff investors who withdrew money 
from their accounts over the years are now wrestling with an ethical and legal 
quandary. What they thought were profits were likely money stolen from other clients 
in what prosecutors are calling the largest Ponzi scheme in history. Now, they are 
confronting the possibility they may have to pay some of it back."). 
34. See SIPC: $61 Million in Commitments Made to MadoffClaimants, with $100 Million 
Level Expected to Be Reached by Memorial Day, supra note 31. 
35. See Jane J. Kim, Hunt Goes On for MiSSing Madoff Money, WALL ST. J., June 29, 
2009, at Cl, available at http://online.wsj.comiarticle/SB124623268250766291.html 
("Even as Mr. Picard gathers up assets, fights are brewing over how much will be paid 
out. Mr. Picard has said he intends to payout claims on a 'net equity' basis, or the 
difference between what customers put in and what they took out. . . . Many former 
Madoff customers want more. Some said their claims should be based on what was 
shown on their November 2008 account statements, which reflected balances of 
nearly $65 billion, before the fraud collapsed."). 
226 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 40 
confirmed that each investor's respective recovery should not exceed 
the amounts invested with Madoff, given the "fictitious" nature of the 
"profits. ,,36 
A. Madoff Committed "Extraordinarily Evil Crimes" 
Here, the message must be sent that Mr. Madoffs crimes 
were extraordinarily evil, and that this kind of irresponsible 
manipulation of the system is not merely a bloodless 
financial crime that takes place just on paper, but that it is 
instead, as we have heard, one that takes a staggering human 
toll. 37 
tJudge Chin 
With those words, Judge Denny Chin sentenced Madoff to the 
statutory maximum of 150 years in a federal penitentiary for his role 
in a multinational, multibillion-dollar Ponzi scheme38 that defrauded 
thousands of investors 39 of some $64.8 billion. Indeed, the 
36. Sec. Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re Bernard L. 
Madoff Inv. Sec, LLC), 424 B.R. 122, 135 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("The account 
statements are entirely fictitious, do not reflect actual securities positions that could be 
liquidated, and therefore cannot be relied upon to detennine Net Equity."); see also 
Chad Bray, Actor Malkovich Wants Morefrom Madoff, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2010, at 
C3, available at http://online. wsj .comiarticle/SB 1 000 142405270230396060457 
5158481004562418.html. Ratherthan accept Picard's determination that the trust was 
only entitled to $670,000, the Malkovich trust sought to recover $2.23 million. Id. 
37. Transcript of Sentencing at 47, United States v. Madoff, No. 09-CR-213-(DC) 
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoffJ 
20090629sentencingtranscriptcorrected.pdf; see also Joanna Chung, Brooke Masters, 
& Alan Rappeport, Madoff Sentenced to 150 Years in Prison, FIN. TIMES (June 29, 
2009, 19: 18), http://www.ft.comlcms/s/0/3c4b9ec2-6496-llde-aI3f-00144feabdcO. 
html. 
38. See Robert Frank & Amir Efrati, 'Evil' MadoffGets 150 Years in Epic Fraud, WALL 
ST. J., June 30, 2009 at AI. Madoff was also ordered to forfeit $170,799,000,000, 
which the Department of Justice contended "represents the total proceeds of and 
property involved in certain of Madoffs crimes." Press Release, Dep't of Justice, 
supra note 21. 
39. See SIPC: $61 Million in Commitments Made to MadoffClaimants, with $100 Million 
Level Expected to Be Reached by Memorial Day, supra note 31 ("8,848 customer 
claims have so far been filed in connection with 3,565 customer accounts at 
BLMIS."). The Government alleged that BLMIS held approximately 4,800 client 
accounts. See Affinnation in Opposition to Madoff's Motion for a Stay and 
Reinstatement of Bail Pending Sentencing Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a) at 6, 
United States v. Madoff, No. 09-1025-cr (2d. Cir. Mar. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madofflmadoftbailpendingsentencing.pdf. 
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magnitude of the Madoff fraud dwarfs WoridCom40 and Enron,41 
"poster children" for corporate fraud of the late 1990s,42 which the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200243 sought to correct. 
Madoff's attorney sought clemency for Madoff and asserted that a 
twelve-year prison sentence effectively was "just short ... of a life 
sentence," given the statistics available to the defense. 44 Madoff's 
40. In SEC v. Worldcom, Court Imposes Full Injunctive Relief, Orders Extensive Reviews 
of Corporate Governance Systems and Internal Accounting Controls, and Orders 
Training and Education Program to Minimize Future Violations, Litigation Release 
No. 17866,2002 WL 31662699 (Nov. 26,2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
litigationllitreleases/lrI7866.htm ("WoridCom materially overstated the income it 
reported on its financial statements by approximately $9 billion."). 
41. Enron Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Item 5 (Nov. 8, 2001), available at 
http://sec.gov/ Archives/edgar/datal 1 02440 1/0000950 1290 1503835lh91831 e8-k.txt 
(restating financial statements to, among other things, record a $1.2 billion reduction 
in shareholders' equity). 
42. Two notable examples are Cendant Corporation, which artificially inflated operating 
income in excess of $500 million from 1995-1997, and Adelphia Communications 
Corporation, which the Commission alleged "failed to record over $2.3 billion in bank 
debt by deliberately shifting those liabilities onto the books of Adelphia's off-balance 
sheet, unconsolidated affiliates." See SEC, REpORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 704 OF THE 
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 11, 29 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/studies/sox704report.pdf. 
43. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of II, 15, 18,28, and 29 U.S.C.); see also Testimony Concerning 
Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Congo 2 (2003) ("The Act also provided welcome 
new enforcement tools to combat corporate fraud, punish corporate wrongdoers and 
deter fraud with the threat of stiffer penalties."). 
44. Transcript of Sentencing, supra note 37, at 34 ("[Madofl] expects ... to live out his 
years in prison."). Or maybe the defense believed that Madoffs 12-year sentence 
request would be more than acceptable because Madoff had (1) "given himself up" 
rather than have the regulators "discover" his crimes, (2) offered some assistance in 
obtaining assets that could be used to compensate investors, and (3) not resisted 
regulators' efforts to close down his business or bar him from the industry; however, 
this is one instance when it was not "business as usual." The Government, however, 
discounted the impact of Madoffs cooperation. Government's Sentencing 
Memorandum, supra note 22 at 14 ("Madoffs claim that he deserves credit for 
'turning himself in' misses the mark. In fact, Madoff waited to tell his family of his 
purported plans to tum himself in only when it became clear, and inevitable, that his 
scheme would collapse, he was almost out of money, and he faced redemption 
requests that he knew he could not meet. Even then, he took steps' that were 
inconsistent with any real acceptance of responsibility for his acts. For example, he 
directed the preparation of approximately 100 checks totaling $173 million made out 
to preferred customers, employees, friends and family, thereby attempting to dissipate 
investors' remaining assets. Had the FBI not arrested him the next day, he might well 
have succeeded." (internal citations omitted)}. 
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attorney buttressed his sentencing recommendation with an appeal to 
the American ideal that justice must be "blind and fair": 
[N]ot blind to the criminal acts that Mr. Madoff pleaded 
guilty to and certainly not blind to the suffering of the 
victims, but blind to the extent that it will achieve a sentence 
that has been set out over the years in the guidelines and the 
cases interpreting the guidelines, and the guidelines and the 
courts and the statutes, your Honor, do not speak of 
vengeance and revenge. 45 
Judge Chin, however, justified his largely "symbolic" sentence of 
150 years for a man with an estimated life expectancy of thirteen 
years by saying, "The symbolism is important because the message 
must be sent that in a society governed by the rule of law, Mr. 
Madoff will get what he deserves, and that he will be punished 
according to his moral culpability. ,,46 
Madoffs investors reportedly were drawn from the United States, 
Europe, Latin America,47 and Japan.48 While Madoffs initial 
45. Transcript of Sentencing, supra note 37, at 32. 
46. Id. at 46-47 (emphasis added); see also Madoff's Evil: Moral Clarity on His Crimes, 
but Who Else Is Guilty? WALL ST. J., June 30, 2009, at A14, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI24631773333870809.html('''Evil' is a word that 
has fallen out of political fashion, suggesting as it does intent or action that is 
irredeemable. Politicians, especiaHy now, prefer to routinely insinuate vaguely 
defined moral failure against individuals, corporations and entire industries for 
opposing an equally vague standard of the public good. No such problem attends 
Bernard Madoff, who himself yesterday described a personality willing to defraud and 
debase all who came into contact with him. MadotT's sentence and Judge Chin's 
remarks fit the crime. They are a rare exercise in moral clarity."). 
47. Investors in Latin America may have been more susceptible to Ponzi schemes 
perpetrated by U.S.-based con artists because of the strength of U.S. dollar-
denominated investments, a desire to avoid unstable domestic political environments 
or "confiscatory tax rates," and the Ponzi scheme's fac;:ade of "legitimacy and 
government oversight." Latin America: More Ponzi Schemes, LATIN Bus. CHRON. 
(Feb. 24, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.comlapp/article.aspx 
?id=3159. "The con artists promised safe regulatory oversight, protection against 
currency devaluation, secrecy (since much of the capital is hiding from authorities), 
and high returns," according to a principal of a forensic accounting and consulting 
firm. Id. 
48. A list purporting to be BLMIS' customers, see Madoff's Victims, supra note II, 
prepared for the bankruptcy proceedings reportedly was made available to the public. 
Dionne Searcey & Amir Efrati, MadoffClients Exposed, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009, at 
AI, available at http://online.wsj.comiarticle/SB 123384533479552435.html. 
However, Judge Chin refused a request by ABC, Inc., NBC Universal, Inc., and Fox 
News Network, LLC to make public email communications sent by BLMIS customers 
to the Department of Justice that described the impact of Madofrs fraud on these 
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investors reportedly were New York- and Palm Beach-based Jewish 
charities and communities, Madoff subsequently was able to attract 
investments from feeder funds whose clients were European and 
Latin American investors. 49 Although Madoffs Ponzi scheme was a 
multinational fraud, the manner in which he dealt with charitable 
foundations and members of the Jewish community had the attributes 
of affinity fraud because of Madoffs unique relationship of "trust 
and friendship" with these investors. 50 Madoff s betrayals of his 
customers. United States v. Madoff, 626 F. Supp. 2d 420, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
Some customers had objected to the release of the email communications for a 
number of reasons, including considerations of "security" for family members. ld. at 
426-27 (concluding that the "countervailing privacy interests of the victims who 
oppose the unsealing of their emails is significant," Judge Chin noted that only 
information that would identify particular persons had been redacted because "the 
'victims' privacy interests are significant, [and] the presumption of access to the 
emails is outweighed.") Given confiscatory tax regimes, and concerns for personal 
safety, it is not uncommon that investors from certain Latin American jurisdictions 
prefer not to disclose their identities. Jose De Cordoba et aI., Latins Quiet About 
Madoff Losses, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2008, at Cl, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 123051003837638329.html; Ed Stoddard, Stanford 
Latam Clients Don't Want Names Known, REUTERS.COM (Mar. II, 2009, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleID=USTRE52A3RI20090311 ("In much 
of Latin America, public knowledge that a person is wealthy or has money for 
investment purposes can make that person or his family targets for kidnappers."); see 
also Jose De Cordoba & Thomas Catan, The Charming Mr. Piedrahita Finds Himself 
Caught in the Madoff Storm, WALL ST. 1., Mar. 31, 2009, at AI, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI23845782470271683.html ("Analysts say Mr. 
Piedrahita ... played a key role in expanding the reach of the Madoff fraud by wooing 
wealthy Latin Americans and Europeans to invest in Fairfield Greenwich, which had 
about half its assets with Mr. Madoff."); David Gauthier-Villars, Financier's Own 
Fortune Led Investors to Madoff, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2008, at Cl, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI23051O 12836438335.html ("[His] story underscores 
how Mr. Madoff's success world-wide relied on a network of feeders who trusted the 
New York fund manager so much they put their whole fortunes in his care."); Zachery 
Kouwe, The Brazilian Connection in the MadoffScandal, DEALBoOKBLOG (Dec. 16, 
2008, I: 18 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12116/the-brazilian-
connection-in-the-madoff-scandal ("The fraud appears to span the globe, with 
investors from South America, Europe and Japan all having invested with Mr. 
Madoff."). 
49. Brooke Masters, Madoff: Off the Fairway, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2009, 20:44), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/628a2dba-ebdd-11 dd-8838-0000779fd2ac,dwp _ uuid=3d I 0 
Oe8 ("While most financial frauds are confined to individual social groups or 
neighborhoods, Mr. Madoff stands accused of running the world's first truly global 
Ponzi scheme. . .. [B]y the mid-2000s, so-called feeder funds that supplied Madoff 
were tapping deep-and not so deep-pockets all over Europe and Latin America."). 
50. SEC, OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. & ADVOCACY, AFFINITY FRAUD: How To AVOID 
INVESTMENT SCAMS THAT TARGET GROUPS I (2009), available at 
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friends, charities, and those who had entrusted their entire savings to 
him were described as "epic in their scope and dazzling in their utter 
lack of remorse or responsibility.,,51 
The private-offering exemption was intended to enable issuers to 
negotiate with sophisticated investors the conditions under which 
capital commitments would be made. 52 However, this exemption is 
not a license for issuers to defraud investors-even if those investors 
are sophisticated. 53 In any event, the failure of so many sophisticated 
investors (or their professional advisors) to exercise diligence on their 
behalf, however, suggests that a fundamental premise for the private-
offering exemption may not be valid, if sophisticated investors lack 
access to material information 54 about the proposed investment. 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/affinity.pdf ("Affinity fraud refers to investment 
scams that prey upon members of identifiable groups, such as religious or ethnic 
communities, the elderly, or professional groups . . .. These scams exploit the trust 
and friendship that exist in groups of people who have something in common."); Lisa 
M. Fairfax, The Thin Line Between Love and Hate: Why Affinity-Based Securities and 
Investment Fraud Constitutes a Hate Crime, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1073, 1142 
(2003) ("Perpetrators of such fraud exhibit more blameworthy conduct because, as 
members of the targeted group, they understand the harmful impact of bias-inspired 
crimes and commit their acts in the face of that understanding."); Lisa M. Fairfax, 
"With Friends Like These . .. "; Toward a More Efficacious Response to Affinity-
Based Securities and Investment Fraud, 36 GA. L. REv. 63, 65 (2001) ("This reliance 
on group trust and sense of community persuades otherwise cautious people to 
participate in many fraudulent investment schemes. "); Transcript of Sentencing, supra 
note 37, at 20 ("[Madoff] betray[ed] ... the virtues people hold dearest-love, 
friendship, trust-and all so he can eat at the finest restaurants, stay at the most 
luxurious resorts, and travel on yachts and private jets."); see also Stephen Greenspan, 
Why We Keep Falling for Financial Scams, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2009, at WI, 
available at http://online.wsj.comiarticle/SBI23093987596650197 .html (noting that 
like Madoff, most of the investors who were introduced to Madoff through their 
country club membership and BLMIS sales representatives were Jewish). 
51. Marc Gellman, A Letter to Madoff, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 23, 2008), 
http://www.newsweek.comlidlI76821 ("An entire world economy we now know is 
based to an immense degree on simple trust, and you have done more than any single 
person to destroy that trust. "). 
52. See H.R. REp. No. 73-85, at 15-16 (1933) (Conf. Rep.) (providing an exemption to 
"permit an issuer to make a specific or isolated sale of its securities to a particular 
person"). 
53. See The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.lOb-5 (2010). 
54. Whether particular information is material requires an examination of the facts and 
circumstances. Information would be material if there were a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable investor would consider it significant in determining whether to 
purchase the offered securities. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2010); TSC Indus. v. Northway, 
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) ("There must be a substantial likelihood that the 
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Several key indicators highlight the limitations of the current 
sophisticated investor standard. Madoffs unparalleled fraud caused 
incalculable damage to investor confidence in U.S. capital markets 
and profound financial ruin of numerous investors, particularly 
elderly retirees, who were reported to have "lost" everything. The 
apparent suicides of a retired military officer55 and a professional 
investment manager were reportedly linked to Madoffs fraud. 56 
Lastly, Madoffs Ponzi scheme affected persons and communities 
who rely on philanthropic entities 57 because those entities have 
shuttered their doors-or have had to curtail significantly their 
activities-because the funds on which they relied to perform their 
essential charitable roles in their respective communities have been 
dissipated as a result of Madoffs fraud. Madoffs tragic, historic, 
and unprecedented investment duplicity and the resulting 
consequential fallout strongly evinces that policy makers should 
reexamine the wisdom of continued reliance on the statutory model 
of sophisticated investors being left to fend for themselves. 
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as 
having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available."). 
55. Allan Little, 'Banking Crisis Killed My Father', BBC NEWS (Feb. 12,2009, 18:42), 
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/printinews.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_ 
news17886894.stm?ad=1 (reporting that he told his son "he had lost all the family 
money-his entire life savings, close probably to £ 1m"). 
56. Gauthier-Villars, supra note 48, at CI (stating that the financier reportedly invested 
$50 million of personal funds with Madoft); Alan Katz, Madoff Investor's Suicide 
Was an "Act of Honor," Brother Says, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 2, 2009, 18:01), 
http://www.bloomberg.comJapps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aZ 1 dnq3VwwOs&refer 
=home# (reporting that the financier who had "entrusted his entire fortune to Madoft" 
died in an apparent suicide). 
57. Masters & Chung, supra note 15 (stating that at least 200 charities are reported to 
have invested with Madoft); Weisel Foundation Loses Nearly Everything in Madoff 
Scheme, supra note 15 ("Many Jewish charities invested with Mr. Madoff, and some 
have had to close their doors."); see also James, supra note 15 (explaining that 
funding for a Seattle-area "social justice project" was imperiled due to reliance on 
donors who were Madoff investors). 
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B. Madoff's Investors: Prominent Persons and "Average 
Americans" 
We invested $475,000 with him... only to discover 
that ... , [m]oney that took us 40 years to accumulate [was] 
lost in a matter of seconds. . .. You see we are the average 
Americans .... Not every victim is a millionaire or 
billionaire[,] some of us were just hard working 
people .... 58 
tMadoffFeeder Fund Investors 
Madoff's investors were diverse: retirees, prominent figures in the 
entertainment and business communities, foundations and charities, 
pension funds, hedge funds, and hedge fund managers. 59 Several 
institutions reportedly invested billions with Madoff. 60 At the time of 
58. Transmittal Letter and Exhibits, supra note 10, at 32 (quoting a wife and husband who 
had invested in a Madoff feeder fund). 
59. Searcey & Efrati, supra note 48 at Al ("An eclectic list purporting to name thousands 
of people who lost money in Mr. Madoff's alleged $50 billion scheme ... includes 
housewives and retirees, a plumbers union and a high school."); Randall Smith, Ex-
Merrill Executives Got Burned by Madoff, WALL ST. 1., Jan. 30, 2009, at Cl, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB123327579767931341; Jenny Strasburg, 
'Dr. Doom' Didn't Predict Madoff Blowup, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31,2008, at Cl, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI23068163425344045.html; Tomio 
Geron, Founding Father of VC Linked to Madoff, WALL ST. 1. BLOG (Feb. 5,2009, 
6: 12 PM), http://blogs. wsj .com/venturecapitaV2009/02/05/founding-father-of-vc-
linked-to-madoff; Kouwe, supra note 48 ("Wealthy Brazilian investors had combined 
exposure of $1 billion to $2 billion in the hedge fund manager Fairfield Greenwich 
Group, the biggest known loser in Bernard L. Madoff's reputed $50 billion Ponzi 
scheme."); Laura Kreutzer, A Few PE Professionals Are On Madoff List, WALL ST. J. 
BLDG (Feb. 5, 2009, 5:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2009/02/05/a-few-
pe-professionals-are-on-madoff-listl; Madoff's Victims, supra note II (providing a list 
of prominent customers and those with large exposures to Madoff's fraud, which 
reportedly includes Union Bancaire Privee ($700 million); Yeshiva University ($14.5 
million); The Elie Weisel Foundation for Humanity ($15.2 million); Hadassah ($90 
million); and New York University ($24 million)); Report: World's Richest Woman 
Fell Victim to Madoff Scheme, TIMES (London), Dec. 24, 2008, available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0.2933.472584.00.html; Vernon Silver & David 
Glovin, Madoff Scandal Ensnares Order of Patron Saint for Moralists, BLOOMBERG 
(Feb. 13, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=20670001&sid=apNDOtibG3HA (stating that Madoff's customers included the 
Congregation ofthe Most Holy Redeemer). 
60. Dumb Money and Dull Diligence: Like Mould, Madoffs Flourish in the Darkness, 
ECONOMIST (Dec. 18, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/12817637/ 
("Tragicomically, a handful of global banks that had fared well during the financial 
meltdown of the past 18 months are on the list of those caught out. HSBC, a British 
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their respective investments with Madoff, these purchasers likely 
would have qualified as sophisticated investors because they were 
wealthy,61 and individually (or with assistance from their respective 
legal or business advisors) they had expertise in financial matters. 62 
Some Madoff investors were not among the "super wealthy" but 
had comparably modest means. 63 These investors presumably 
satisfied the minimum dollar threshold for accredited investors as a 
result of a lifetime of saving and investing, inheritance, or sale of a 
bank, Santander of Spain, and BNP Paribas of France: all bear a share of losses that 
add up to $33 billion, according to a Bloomberg tally. So were the suave private 
bankers of Switzerland and Singapore."); Madoff's Victims, supra note 11 (showing 
institutions reported to have invested at least a billion dollars include Fairfield 
Greenwich Advisers ($7.5 billion), Tremont Group Holdings ($3.3 billion), Banco 
Santander ($2.87 billion), Bank Medici ($2.1 billion), Ascot Partners ($1.8 billion), 
Access International Advisers ($1.5 billion), Fortis ($1.35 billion), and HSBC ($1 
billion)). 
61. One measure of wealth is net worth (individually or jointly with one's spouse) in 
excess of one million dollars, which is the standard for a natural person to qualify as 
an accredited investor within the meaning of rule 501(a)(5) of Regulation D. 17 
C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (2010). Another financial measure of wealth is based on an 
investor's annual income. For example, an individual whose income exceeds 
$200,000 (or $300,000, jointly with one's spouse) in each of the two most recent years 
who reasonably expects a similar income in the current year also would qualify as an 
accredited investor. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6) (2010). In the years preceding the 
1929 Stock Market Crash, being a millionaire was described as "the standard 
benchmark for being rich." However, millionaire status seemed diminished with the 
creation of "a vast new crop of millionaires" in the latter half of the decade, so that by 
1929, one million dollars no longer qualified one as "really rich," according to Samuel 
Crowther. LARRY SAMUEL, RICH: THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN WEALTH 
CULTURE 42-43 (2009). In 2008, one million dollars would be worth approximately 
$139,395,752.90, using the relative share of Gross Domestic Product as the basis for 
calculation. Six Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a u.s. Dollar Amount, 1774 
to Present, MEASURINGWORTH, http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/ 
uscompare3 (last visited Jan. 6, 2011) (explaining that the share of Gross Domestic 
Product is a means of measuring the "economic power" of particular individuals who 
lived in different eras by comparing the size of their wealth to the economy in which 
they lived). By contrast, the threshold for entry on the Forbes 400, a compilation of 
the 400 richest Americans, was a net worth of $1.3 billion in 2008. The Forbes 400, 
FORBES (Sept. 17, 2008, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/16/forbes-400-
billionaires-lists-400list08 _ cx _ mn _091 7richamericans _Iand.html (stating that 
although 19% of those profiled inherited wealth, two-thirds were self-made). 
62. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(h), 506(b)(2)(ii) (2009). 
63. See Transmittal Letter and Exhibits, supra note 10. 
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family business. 64 It was reported, however, that Madoffs investors 
also included "hundreds of ordinary retail investors.,,65 
The "victim impact statements" filed with the court described the 
devastating impact of Madoffs Ponzi scheme on many investors. 66 
Judge Chin received "several hundred" written statements from 
Madoff s investors and granted nine investors' requests to speak at 
Madoffs sentencing hearing. 67 They described to Judge Chin the 
adverse impact of the fraud on their lives, including the loss of 
financial security because key pension-distribution and health-
insurance decisions were based on their "savings and security with 
Madoff.,,68 For example, Madoffs fraud deprived a widow of her 
ability to care for herself, meet important societal needs through 
charitable donations, and support the educational needs of future 
generations of her family. 69 These investors urged Judge Chin to 
sentence Madoff to the fullest extent of the law. 70 
Many individuals described feelings of depression, angst, shame, or 
humiliation at a newfound penury that required them to rely on 
social-welfare programs. 71 One couple described their experience 
64. Id. 
65. Masters, supra note 49 ("Performance records of European funds that sent money to 
Mr. Madoff were meanwhile attracting attention-and money-from hundreds of 
ordinary retail investors."). 
66. See Transmittal Letter and Exhibits, supra note 1 0 (correspondence from Madoff 
Victims Submitted to the U.S. Attorney's Office); see also 113 MadofJ Victims Tell 
Their Stories, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2009, at C3, available at 
http://online.wsj .comlarticle/SB 124511290745717267 .html. 
67. Transcript of Sentencing, supra note 37, at 4. Since two investors from the same 
family wanted to address the court, Judge Chin directed that one person could speak 
on behalf of the family. Two investors withdrew their request to address the court. 
Id. 
68. Id. at 5-7 (statement of a retired New York City Correction Officer). 
69. Id. at 9 (statement of a sixty-one-year-old widow). 
70. See id. at 47; see also Annelena Lobb, For Victims, Downsized Lives and Many 
Shattered Dreams, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2009, at C I, available at 
http://online.wsj.comiarticle/SBI24623313963566369.html(,,Some elderly victims 
are going back to work for the first time in decades, taking minimum-wage jobs."). 
71. Transcript of Sentencing, supra note 37, at 12. A sixty-three-year-old couple who had 
returned to work stated "[w]e can only work as long as our health will hold up and 
then we will have to sell our home and hope to survive on social security alone." Id. 
A physical therapist and her husband invested their "entire life savings with Madoff." 
Id. at 14-15. When the physical therapist spoke about her mother, who was also a 
Madoff investor, she claimed "[n]ow all she has to live on is a sparce [sic] social 
security check and a small pension which will last less than one year." Id. One sixty-
five-year-old New York City native claims she "manage[s] on food stamps. At the 
end of the month 1 sometimes scavage [sic] in dumpsters. I cannot afford new 
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since Madoffs exposure as "a living hell. It feels like a nightmare 
that we can't wake from."n The written statements filed by several 
Madoff investors-many newly impoverished-chronicled hardships 
engendered by their new statuses. For example, elderly couples were 
robbed of their sense of dignity, financial independence, and 
tranquility, and now must rely on whatever resources are available 
from their children and on social-welfare programs to sustain 
themselves. 73 Other investors described the unfathomable situation 
of a lifetime of savings-the product of prudent and fiscally 
conservative life choices-that dissipated into thin air. 74 A few 
investors identified themselves as personal acquaintances of the 
Madoff family and expressed indignation at Madoffs fraudulent 
conduct. 75 
Moreover, other investors were frustrated by a lack of government 
financial support for their plight comparable to the "rescues" that 
were made available to industry segments such as financial firms, 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and automakers; instead, they "have found 
surprising hostility to their predicament.,,76 
C. Impairment of Investor Confidence in Markets 
As we have observed since the onset of what has been called a 
global credit 77 crisis, trust is an integral component of vibrant capital 
eyeglasses. I long to go to a concert, but I never do. Sometimes, my heartbeats [sic] 
erratically for lack of medication when I cannot pay for it." Id. at 22-23. 
72. Id. at 15. 
73. See Transmittal Letter and Exhibits, supra note 10, at 20 (including a letter to the 
judge from a seventy-six-year-old husband who invested an IRA with Madoff). 
74. Transcript of Sentencing, supra note 37, at 9-10, 12, 14-15, 17,21,25. 
75. See Transmittal Letter and Exhibits, supra note 10, at 45 ("We are outraged by this 
crime and sick at heart at the callousness of the perpetrator."); id. ("We also knew 
Bernie and Ruth Madoffpersonally for over 40 years .... I would like the chance to 
speak and let Bernie know that our spirit will still live on even though financially we 
have been destroyed."); Lobb, supra note 70, at Cl ("For many victims, downsizing 
their lives has been jarring partly because of the illusion of steady returns that Mr. 
Madoff created, month after month, in account statements filled with blue chips such 
as Procter & Gamble Co. and AT&T Inc. Mr. Madoff actually bought no securities, 
so the dividends and sale proceeds tallied up should have been zeroes."). 
76. Dionne Searcey, Post-Madoff, a Support Network, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2009, at C3, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI23353195044337435.html(reporting 
that a couple who lost "the bulk of their life savings" of $1.1 million wrote "I know 
you are as frustrated as I am that our government has been silent to date on providing 
any assistance or advice to the victims"). 
77. Indeed, the origin of credit is the Latin word creditum, which is derived from credere, 
"to believe," "to trust." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1138 (2d ed. 1989). 
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markets. 78 According to Paul Seabright, an economist at the 
University of Toulouse in France, 
trust in a modem economy has evolved to the miraculous 
point where people give complete strangers sums of money 
they would not dream of entrusting to their next-door 
neighbours [sic]. From that a further miracle follows, for 
trust is what raises the billions of dollars that fund modem 
industry. 79 
The failures of large financial institutions-such as insurers, 
commercial banks, and securities broker-dealers-precipitated a 
crisis of confidence in the ability of financial institutions to honor 
their commitments. 80 The Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 
from 12,474.52 on January 3,2007, to 8,776.39 by the end of2008. 81 
Governmental authorities around the world responded, in part, by 
implementing "rescue plans"--or "bailouts"--of financial 
institutions deemed fundamental to their economies. 82 
78. See POPE BENEDICT XVI, CARITAS IN VERITATE ~ 35 (2009), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy _ fatherlbenedict_xvi/encyclicals/ documents/hf _ ben-
xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html ("In a climate of mutual trust, the 
market is the economic institution that permits encounter between persons, inasmuch 
as they are economic subjects who make use of contracts to regulate their relations as 
they exchange goods and services of equivalent value between them, in order to 
satisfy their needs and desires. . .. Without internal forms of solidarity and mutual 
trust, the market cannot completely fulfil [sic] its proper economic function. And 
today it is this trust which has ceased to exist, and the loss of trust is a grave loss."). 
79. Edward Carr, Greed-and Fear, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 2009, at 3, available at 
http://www.economist.com/specialreports/PrinterFriendl y .cfm?story _ id= 1295 7709. 
80. See Charles L. Evans, President & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Remarks at the 
Czech National Bank: Central Banking in Times of Crisis (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/speeches/2009/03 .24_ CR _ speech.c 
fm ("Because of balance-sheet capacity limitations, or because of higher-than-normal 
uncertainty and risk aversion, market participants are largely avoiding markets that are 
undergoing unusual stress."); see also infra notes 95, 98. 
81. Dow Jones Industrial Average, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2009, at R6 (listing reported 
averages at the close of market); cf SEC, DRAFT-STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 
2010-2015, at 5 (2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secstratplanI015.pdf 
("Between June 2007 and November 2008, Americans lost more than a quarter of 
their net worth. By early November 2008, the value of retirement, savings, and 
investment assets suffered dramatic losses, and housing prices had dropped 20 percent 
from their 2006 peak."). 
82. Asian Nations Unveil $120 Billion Liquidity Fund, WALL ST. J., May 4,2009, at Al 0; 
Luca di Leo & Christopher Emsden, Italy Is Ready to Commit Funds to Banking 
Sector, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct. 30, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SBI22532681747882483.htm1; James Glynn & Rachel Pannett, In Australia, New 
Measures Add Liquidity, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13,2008, at A5; Marcus Walker et aI., 
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Investors in hedge funds reportedly have redeemed substantial 
amounts of capital from these investment vehicles. In October 2008, 
hedge funds experienced their worst month of withdrawals. 83 In 
some instances, funds have been shuttered in the face of extreme 
levels of withdrawals by investors. 84 Some institutional investors 
pressed hedge funds for more favorable investment terms. 85 
A number of Madoff investors responded by initiating claims 
against persons they held responsible for Madoffs fraud, including 
certain financial institutions that provided administrative services to 
Madoffs business86 and the Commission. 87 In the case of Fairfield 
Greenwich Group, one of the largest feeder funds invested with 
Madoff, Massachusetts regulators alleged that the fund breached its 
fiduciary duty to its investors when it "[failed] to provide promised 
due diligence" on the fund's investments in Madoffs program. 88 
Europe Races to Shore Up Banks as Crisis Spreads, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6,2008, at AI; 
Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Unveils $51.5 Billion Stimulus, WALL ST. 1., Oct. 31,2008, at 
A9. 
83. Kevin Kingsbury, Last Month, $40 Billion Pulled from Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 21,2008, at C8; cf Cassell Bryan-Low, Another Wave of Withdrawals Expected 
to Hit Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2,2009, at Cl (reporting that Morgan Stanley 
analysts estimated a decline in assets under management of 30% for 2009, in addition 
to the 20% decline for the last six months of2008). 
84. Jenny Strasburg, Gregory Zuckerman & Cassell Bryan-Low, Crisis on Wall Street: 
More Hedge Funds Expected to Succumb, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2008, at B2 ("Some 
have curtailed their selling of securities in recent days even amid a torrent of 
withdrawal requests."). 
85. See Jenny Strasburg & Craig Karmin, Calpers Tells Hedge Funds to Fix Terms-or 
Else, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2009, at B 1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB123818466240759815.html (reporting that like some other institutional investors, 
Calpers wants its hedge funds managers to offer a more favorable performance fee 
structure, give Calpers the ability to "recoup fees from previous profitable years after 
a period of poor performance," and disclose securities held in the fund's portfolio). 
86. See Robin Sidel, Aggrieved Investors Turn Sights to Banks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3,2009, 
at Cl, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI23362103067641611.html 
("Some [Madoft] investors ... contend that financial institutions handling money for 
[Madoffs] firm should have known about the alleged fraud."). 
87. Kara Scanell, Two Investors Sue SEC Over Madoff Probe, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15,2009, 
at Al9 (reporting that a retired office worker and doctor seek to hold the Commission 
accountable for its role). 
88. Ashby Jones, Mass. Sues Madoff Feeder-Fund Fairfield Greenwich, Alleging Fraud, 
WSJ BLOGS (Apr. 1, 2009, 10:37 AM), http://blogs.wsj.comllaw/2009/04/01lmass-
sues-madoff-feeder-fund-fairfield-greenwich-alleging-fraud/; see also Robert Frank & 
Tom Lauricella, Madoff Feeder Is Charged in Fraud, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2,2009, at 
Cl, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 123859307450378115.html; Karen 
Freifeld & Katherine Burton, Massachusetts Accuses Fairfield Greenwich of Fraud, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 1, 2009, 15:09), http://www.bloomberg.comlapps/news? 
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New York authorities subsequently sued J. Ezra Merkin, former 
GMAC Chairman and philanthropist, alleging that he was not an 
"investing guru," as he had represented, "but a master marketer.,,89 
While Celfin Capital of Chile reportedly made full repayment to its 
clients,90 Safra Banking Group,91 Banco Santander, 92 and Union 
Bancaire Privee93 reportedly offered to cover some losses sustained 
by their clients who were Madoff investors. When one considers the 
fees that certain asset managers, like Luxalpha, reportedly charged 
clients for their professional expertise, it could hardly inspire investor 
confidence in asset managers when it became widely known that the 
actual investment decisions had been handed off to Madoff.94 
2008 was a tumultuous year filled with constant challenges for 
investors: J.P. Morgan Chase purchased the distressed Bear Steams, 
the federal government rescued Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
Lehman Brothers melted down, Bank of America acquired a 
pid=newsarchive&sid=aEFaKZOGiedw (quoting Secretary of State William F. 
Galvin: "The allegations against Fairfield in this complaint outline a total disregard 
for such responsibility, which helped the Madoff scheme stay afloat for so long."). 
But see Tom Lauricella, Fairfield Greenwich Says Madoff Provided Bad Data, WALL 
Sr. J., Mar. 2, 2009, at C2 (asserting that MadotT's fraud impeded Fairfield 
Greenwich's ability to conduct diligence); Fairfield Greenwich Group Rejects 
Massachusetts Accusations, Apr. 29, 2009, available at 
https://www.fggus.comlguestlnotice2.html. 
89. Liz Rappaport, Financier Charged in Madoff Fraud, WALL Sr. 1., Apr. 7,2009, at AI, 
available at http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SB I 23903070566093099.htrnl (reporting 
that Merkin placed $2.4 billion of investors' funds with Madoft); see also Follow the 
Feeders, ECoNoMIsr, Jan. 3, 2009, at 55, available at http://www.economist.coml 
finance/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=12855455 ("New York Law School contends it 
would never have invested $3m with Ascot Partners had it known that the fund was 
charging hefty fees merely to stick all its eggs in one basket."). It is estimated that 
feeder funds were paid $790 million in management and other fees in respect of funds 
directed to Madoff. Tom Lauricella, Feeder Fees Topped $790 Million, WALL Sr. J., 
Apr. 11, 2009, at B2, available at http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SBI23940 
737747310069.html. 
90. Antonio Regalado, Bank to Cover Some Madoff Losses, WALL Sr. J., (Mar. 10, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SBI23665403576179839.html(reporting that the 
investment bank paid $11 million to its clients). 
91. ld. 
92. Jose de Cordoba & Thomas Catan, Santander Improves Compensation Offer, WALL 
Sr. J., Feb. 17,2009, at C5. 
93. Cassell Bryan-Low, MadofJ-Stung Union Bancaire Regroups, WALL Sr. J., Mar. 23, 
2009, at C2, available at http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SB 123 776596117909221.htrnl. 
94. See Gauthier-Villars, supra note 48. For example, Luxalpha reportedly assessed 
clients a 5% hurdle fee, a 16% performance fee, and a 0.8% annual management fee. 
Id. 
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vulnerable Merrill Lynch & CO.,95 access to credit in the commercial 
paper markets was limited,96 the government provided insurance to 
shore up money market funds,97 the government gave substantial 
assistance to American International Group, 98 and the Federal 
Reserve expanded its lending facilities in an effort to stabilize 
financial markets. 99 So, the revelation that a former chairman of 
NASDAQ had perpetrated a multibillion-dollar Ponzi scheme over a 
period of decades undercut any reason for investors to commit capital 
to markets that seemed fundamentally untrustworthy.lOo A Harrison 
Group survey showed that 63% of rich Americans had "lost faith in 
financial institutions." 101 As one observer noted, "If the former 
chairman of Nasdaq [sic] is a crook, whom do you trust?,,102 
95. See Carrick Mollenkamp et aI., Crisis on Wall Street as Lehman Totters, Merrill is 
Sold, AIG Seeks to Raise Cash, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, at AI, available at 
http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SBI22139688846233147.html. 
96. See Anusha Shrivastava, Commercial-Paper Market Seizes Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 
2008, at C2, available at http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SBI22174858590452493.html. 
97. See Daisy Maxey, Money Funds Seek Insurance, WALL ST. 1., Oct. 2,2008, at C7, 
available at http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SBI22291097601796803.html. 
98. See Matthew Kamitschnig et a!., u.s. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; 
Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17,2008, at AI, 
available at http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SBI22156561931242905.html(''[B]ailout 
caps a tumultuous 10 days that have remade the American financial system."). 
99. See Jon Hilsenrath & Sudeep Reddy, Fed Expands Lending Facilities in Bid for 
Stability, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, at AI8 (according to Chairman Benjamin 
Bemanke's prepared statement, the Fed's actions together "with significant 
commitments from the private sector, are intended to mitigate the potential risks and 
disruptions to markets"). 
100. Nicholas von Hoffman, Bernard Madoff, Trust-Buster, NATION Dec. 17, 2008, 
http://www.thenation.comlarticlelbemard-madoff-trust-buster. 
101. Show Them the Money: The Rich Have Become Disillusioned with the People Who 
Look After Their Fortunes, ECONOMIST, Apr. 4, 2009, at 5, available at 
http://www.economist.comlspecialreportslPrinter Friendly .cfrn ?story _ id= 13 3 56628. 
102. von Hoffman, supra note 100. 
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D. Impairment of Investor Confidence in Regulators 
Can you imagine just waking up one day and finding out 
someone had stolen all of your life's work and savings .... 
I felt violated, and I had relied on the SEC to protect me, not 
ever thinking that they would end up acting like co-
conspirators or keystone cops. 103 
t Madoff Customer 
A number of Madoff investors criticized the Commission and other 
regulatory authorities, in one case describing regulators as "Madoff's 
tools." 104 These investors were "devastated by the SEC's failure to 
uncover Madoff's fraud,,105 and generally were disappointed with 
"those agencies that were set up to protect [them].,,106 One elderly 
woman described the Madoff investors as "the remnants of stunning 
indifference." 107 
1. Systemic Failures by the Commission's Staff 
Indeed, Madoff had come to the Commission's staff's attention 
when the Commission brought an enforcement action against two 
Florida accountants, whom the Commission charged had engaged in 
unregistered distributions of securities, and promised investors "hard-
to-believe annual returns of 13.5% [to] 20%-to be obtained by 
turning the money over to be managed by an unnamed broker." 108 
103. Transmittal Letter and Exhibits, supra note 10, at 41 (quoting a former real estate 
developer and investor who had two accounts with Madoft). 
104. Transcript of Sentencing, supra note 37, at 10-11, 16,23,30. 
105. Id. at 16. 
106. Id. at 30. 
107. Id. at 23. 
108. Randall Smith, Wall Street Mystery Features a Big Board Rival, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 
1992, at Cl, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI22909929808301893.html 
("Madoffsays he didn't know the money he was managing had been raised illegally. 
. .. 'I would be surprised if anybody thought that matching the S&P over 10 years 
was anything outstanding,' he says."); see also Follow the Feeders, supra note 89, at 
55 ("The [Commission] gave short shrift to those who suspected him of 
wrongdoing-including Harry Markopolos, an erstwhile rival who in 2005 sent the 
commission a 19-page analysis entitled 'The world's largest hedge fund is a fraud.' 
The report listed 29 'red flags' that, taken together, strongly suggested the Madoff 
operation's returns were either fictitious or due to front-running (trading one's own 
account ahead of filling client orders)."). 
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In May 1999, Harry Markopolos, a self-described "derivatives 
expert," initially presented "observations" (enumerating twenty-nine 
red flags) to the Commission's Boston Regional Office in support of 
his view that Madoff s hedge fund was a fraud. 109 Markopolos 
continued to press the matter with the Commission staff for almost a 
decade. 110 In each instance, the Boston Regional Office referred the 
matter to the Commission's New York Regional Office; however, 
Markopolos was not convinced that the staff of the New York 
Regional Office "had the derivatives or mathematical background to 
understand the violations." III Although Markopolos was not aware 
of efforts by the staff to investigate Madoff, Massachusetts regulators 
alleged that Madoff had "coached" officials of a hedge fund to 
prepare them for their interview with the Commission's staff. 112 
After acknowledging "multiple failures over at least a decade to 
thoroughly investigate [credible and specific] allegations or at any 
point to seek formal authority to pursue them," then-Chairman 
Christopher Cox directed the Commission's Office of Inspector 
General to conduct a "full and immediate review of the past 
allegations regarding Mr. Madoff and his firm and the reasons they 
were not found credible.,,113 
109. THE WORLD'S LARGEST HEDGE FUND IS A FRAUD, Submission to the SEC I (2005), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509/exhibit-0293.pdf 
(anonymously submitted by Markopolos, citing concerns for his "personal safety" and 
that of his family). 
110. Michael R. Crittenden, Markopolos Blasts SEC for 'Financial Illiteracy,' WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 4, 2009, at C4 (reporting that Markopolos did not bring his insights to the 
attention of the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation because he did not believe he would 
be taken seriously given "the SEC's decision not to pursue the case" or to FINRA 
"because of the Madofffamily's connections to FINRA."). 
III. Email fromHarryMarkopolostoJonathanSokobin, SEC, (Apr. 2,2008, II : 13 AM), 
available at http://sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509/exhibit-0398.pdf. Markopolos 
also mentioned a second-hand report of a hedge fund manager who withdrew 
"significant assets" out of Madoff s fund after that manager "discovered that none of 
the Madoff trade tickets [for his fund] matched any time & sales reports on [Options 
Price Reporting Authority]." Id. 
112. Robert Frank & Tom Lauricella, Madoff Feeder Is Charged in Fraud, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 2, 2009, at CI, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI2385930 
7450378115.html ("The complaint [filed by Massachusetts regulators] ... says Mr. 
Madoff coached officials at Fairfield Greenwich Group on how to deflect questions 
from Securities and Exchange Commission investigators."). 
113. Press Release, Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Statement Regarding Madoff 
Investigation, (Dec. 16, 2008), available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
297.htm. H. David Kotz, Inspector General of the Commission, testified that his 
office's investigation will examine (I) how the Commission's staff handled the 
Madoff complaints, including whether the staff complied with the Commission's 
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The Office of Inspector General (OIG) concluded that the 
Commission had received "numerous substantive complaints since 
1992" about Madoffs activities, which should have led the staff to 
question "whether Madoff was actually engaged in trading" and to 
initiate a "thorough examination and/or investigation of the 
possibility that Madoffwas operating a Ponzi scheme.,,114 According 
to the OIG, the Commission could have "uncovered" Madoffs 
fraudulent scheme well in advance of his confession in December 
2008 had the staff engaged in "appropriate follow-up" of the five 
examinations of Madoffs operations. 115 These failures, however, 
were not found to have been the result of staff "misconduct" or 
"inappropriate influence" exerted by senior staff but rather reflected 
"systematic breakdowns" in the conduct of the Commission's 
examination and investigation program. 116 
policies and procedures; (2) alleged conflicts of interest involving Commission 
officials or staff and Madoff family members, and the impact those relationships may 
have had on the Commission's regulatory examinations and oversight of Madoff and 
related entities; (3) the efficacy of the Commission's examination program for Madoff 
and related entities, and whether failures to conduct "timely reviews or examinations 
of Bernard Madoffs activities and filings" violated the Commission's policies and 
procedures; and (4) whether "decisions regarding investigations, examinations and 
inspections" of Madoff entities may have been affected by Madotrs prominence in 
the securities industry, participation on Commission-sponsored advisory committees, 
and "social and professional relationships with SEC officials." Testimony Be/ore H. 
Comm. on Financial Services, III th Congo (2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/testimony/2009ltsO 10509hdk.htm (statement of H. David Kotz, Inspector Gen., 
SEC); see also Patrick Jenkins, SEC Blamed/or Failing to Spot MadoffFraud (July 3, 
2009), http://www.ft.comlcms/s/0/eeI59Ia2-6726-llde-925f-00144feabdcO ("[The 
Commission's staff] had always 'lacked the sophistication and skillset' necessary to 
do their jobs effectively. The SEC was staffed with too many lawyers and not enough 
economists and market practioners [sic]."); Frank & Efrati, supra note 38, at Al ("The 
case has also highlighted shortcomings of financial watchdogs, particularly the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, which failed to catch the crime despite 
repeated warnings."); Ianthe Jeanne Dugan & David Crawford, Accounting Firms that 
Missed Fraud at Madoff May Be Liable, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18,2009, at Cl ("Some 
critics also blame the SEC ... [which] suspended the rule [that required auditors of] 
private financial partnerships, such as hedge funds" to be registered with the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board, which was established "to help detect 
fraud."); von Hoffman, supra note 100, at 2 ("Fear, confusion and mistrust have been 
amplified by the absence of government supervision, regulation or policing. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission admits it did not do its job. "). 
114. SEC, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION, REpORT No. OIG-509, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF 
SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF'S PONZI SCHEME: PUBLIC VERSION 456 (2009), 
available at hrtp://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 457. 
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III. INVESTOR SOPHISTICATION: A PROXY FOR FEDERAL 
OVERSIGHT 
The private-offering exemption is practically sacrosanct in federal 
securities law. This exemption allows issuers to raise capital from 
purchasers who are sophisticated investors without complying with 
the public-disclosure-oriented registration regime of the Securities 
Act of 1933. 117 
As interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, the 
legislative policy underlying this statutory exemption is premised on 
the view that the disclosure regime would offer little benefit for 
sophisticated investors because this class of investors has access to 
information that these investors deem important for their respective 
investment decisions. 118 Thus, sophisticated investors are considered 
to have the wherewithal to "fend for themselves" 119 in the capital 
markets. 
The federal regulatory approach requires registration for 
nonexempt securities and transactions. 120 In lieu of registration, the 
statute substitutes "private" monitoring of disclosures in private 
placements. 121 Through their role in the private placement, 
sophisticated investors can attain similar ends as would occur under 
the registration regime. 122 Consequently, their status as sophisticated 
investors effectively functions as a proxy for direct oversight by 
federal authorities of material disclosures that issuers would be 
required to provide to their investors. 123 
In this section, I summarize the legislative history of the disclosure-
oriented regime of the Securities Act and the private-offering 
exemption afforded by Section 4(2). Next, I discuss the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of Ralston Purina, which defined the scope of 
the private-offering exemption. However, the application of Ralston 
Purina's principles required difficult, largely subjective judgments 
117. Securities Act of 1933 Section 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2006). 
118. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125-27 (1953) (interpreting the scope 
of the private offering exemption afforded by Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, the 
Court stated the "focus of inquiry should be on the need of the offerees for the 
protections afforded by registration. The employees here were not shown to have 
access to the kind of information which registration would disclose."). 
119. /d. at 125 ("An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a 
transaction 'not involving any public offering. "'). 
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c-d. 
121. See Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 124-25. 
122. See infra Part II.S. 
123. See infra Part II.D. 
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concerning the sophistication of investors. 124 Therefore, Congress 
and the Commission responded by adopting the accredited investor 
definition to provide an objective standard for assessing investor 
sophistication within the meaning of the private-offering 
exemption. 125 I conclude this section with the policy considerations 
that underlie the treatment of sophisticated investors who participate 
in transactions pursuant to the private-offering exemption. 
A. Legislative History-An Overview 
The period leading up to the 1929 Stock Market Crash was 
characterized by confidence that the newly established Federal 
Reserve, "with its ability to control interest rates and conduct open 
market operations ... [, was] ... 'the remedy to the whole problem 
of booms, slumps, and panics. '" 126 The prices of securities traded on 
securities markets often were "susceptible to manipulation and 
control." 127 Speculators-including celebrities-borrowed money to 
invest in the stock market, "[using] debt to pyramid investments and 
enhance gains." 128 "Excessive speculation" 129 coupled with buying 
securities with borrowed funds drained credit that could have been 
made available for "trade, industry, and transportation in interstate 
commerce." 130 The two-year period leading up to the 1929 Crash 
was described as an "abandonment of the analytical approach" in 
favor of a "pseudo-analysis [of facts and figures] to support the 
delusions of the period.,,131 
In the aftermath of the crash as the nation endured the Great 
Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt urged support for 
"[fJederal supervision of traffic in investment securities in interstate 
124. See infra Part II.B. 
125. See infra Part II.C. 
126. EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL 
SPECULATION 192 (2000). 
127. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006). 
128. See CHANCELLOR, supra note 126, at 207. 
129. BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS: THE CLASSIC 1940 SECOND 
EDITION 66 (2d ed. 1962) (stating that in contrast to investment, "[s]peculation ... 
may always properly-and often soundly-derive its basis and its justification from 
prospective developments that differ from past performance."); THOMAS SOWELL, 
BASIC ECONOMICS: A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO THE ECONOMY 262 (3d ed. 2007) 
(stating that unlike gambling where one seeks "to profit or exhibit one's skill or lack 
of fear" by "[creating a risk that would otherwise not exist], ... economic speculation 
involves ... coping with an inherent risk in such a way as to minimize it and to leave 
it to be borne by whoever is best equipped to bear it."). 
130. 15 V.S.c. § 78b. 
131. GRAHAM & DODD, supra note 129, at 17. 
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commerce,"132 given "severe losses [sustained by the public] through 
practices neither ethical nor honest on the part of many persons and 
corporations selling securities.,,133 For example, of the estimated 
"[fifty] billions of new securities offered in the post-war decade, 
'half ... have been proved to be worthless. ",134 The House Report 
observed that 
[t]hese cold figures spell tragedy in the lives of thousands of 
individuals who invested their life savings, accumulated 
after years of effort, in these worthless securities. The 
flotation of such a mass of essentially fraudulent securities 
was made possible because of the complete abandonment by 
many underwriters and dealers in securities of those 
standards of fair, honest, and prudent dealing that should be 
basic to the encouragement of investment in any enterprise. 
Alluring promises of easy wealth were freely made with 
little or no attempt to bring to the investor's attention those 
facts essential to estimating the worth of any security. 
High-pressure salesmanship rather than careful counsel was 
the rule in this most dangerous of enterprises. 135 
As a response to these abuses and the harm to domestic industry 
and capital markets, Congress enacted the Securities Act, the first of 
the New Deal securities statutes. 136 The purpose of the Securities Act 
is to "provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities 
sold in interstate and foreign commerce ... and to prevent frauds in 
the sale" of securities. 137 This is accomplished principally by 
requiring registration of public offerings with the Commission and 
generally imposing civil liability and criminal sanctions on issuers, 
directors and officers of issuers, underwriters, and accountants for 
prospectuses or oral communications that include omissions or 
misstatements of material information. 138 
Consistent with President Roosevelt's letter to Congress,139 the 
Securities Act did not provide a federal guarantee or approval for 
132. H.R. Doc. No. 73-12, at 1 (1933). 
133. Id. 
134. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933) (Conf. Rep.). 
135. ld. 
136. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006). 
137. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa 
(2006)). 
138. 48 Stat. 74 §§ 11, 12(a)(2), 17, 20(d), 24 (2010). 
139. H.R. Doc. No. 73-12, at 1 (1933). 
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secuntIes issued in registered public offerings. 140 Rather than 
regulate the "merit" of particular offerings (as was common under 
some state blue-sky laws),141 the disclosure regime applied "sunshine 
[as] the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 
policeman." 142 Therefore, the Commission's role is to determine 
whether the information filed in the registration statement is complete 
and accurate on its face. 143 The Commission may exercise its 
authority to prevent a public distribution of securities before or after 
effectiveness of the registration statement. 144 Prior to the effective 
date of the registration statement, the Commission may prevent 
effectiveness if the registration statement appears to be "incomplete 
or inaccurate in any material respect.,,14 After the registration 
statement becomes effective, the Commission may suspend 
effectiveness if the registration statement appears to contain any 
material misstatement or omission. 146 Any refusal order issued under 
Section 8(b) or stop order issued under Section 8( d) would continue 
in effect until the registration statement was amended to comply with 
the order. 147 Although the Commission does not have statutory 
authority to regulate the merits of a public offering, it has 
considerable power to protect investors when evidence shows that 
material information concerning the securities is false or 
misleading. 148 
Congress provided an exemption from the registration requirement 
for "certain types of securities and securities transactions where there 
140. ld. 
141. These state securities statutes were so-named because they were intended to protect 
the public from "speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of 
'blue sky. '" Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 551 (1917). By the time of the 
1929 Stock Market Crash, forty-seven states had enacted blue-sky laws. S. REp. No. 
73-47, at 2 (1933). 
142. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (2nd 
prtg. 1914) (commending the salutary effect of "[p ]ublicity ... as a remedy for social 
and industrial diseases"); H.R. REp. No. 73-12, at 1 ("There is ... an obligation upon 
us to insist that every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be 
accompanied by full pUblicity and information, and that no essentially important 
element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public."). 
143. H.R. REp. No. 73-85, at 4 (1933) (Conf. Rep.). 
144. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77h(b), (d). In both instances, the Commission 
must give notice and afford the registrant an opportunity for a hearing before issuing 
any order of § 8(b) or (d) of the Securities Act. Jd. 
145. § 77h(b). 
146. § 77h(d). 
147. § 77h(b), (d). 
148. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38,48 Stat. 74 §§ 11, 12(a)(2), 17, 20(d), 24 (2010); 48 
Stat. 881 §§ 10(b), 21 (d)(3)(B) (2010); 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (2010). 
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is no practical need for its application or where the public benefits are 
too remote.,,149 These transactions are not exempt from the anti-fraud 
provisions of federal securities law. 150 
One of the exemptions from the registration regime is the private-
offering exemption in Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, which 
provides an exemption for "transactions by an issuer not involving 
any public offering.,,151 The purpose of this exemption is to "permit 
an issuer to make a specific or isolated sale of its securities to a 
particular person" so long as the transaction does not involve a 
distribution of securities to the public. 152 
B. Scope of the Private-Offering Exemption 
One of the early issues raised by the private-offering exemption 
concerned the nature of the offerees to whom issuers may privately 
offer securities. 153 In his interpretative letter, the Commission's 
general counsel discussed the importance of the offerees' relationship 
with each other and to the issuer.154 He construed the exemption for 
the private offering as one made to "members of the class who should 
have special knowledge of the issuer." 155 As an example, he 
observed the "special relationship" enjoyed by an issuer's high 
executive officers, a relationship not available to subordinate 
employees. 156 
149. H.R. REp. No. 73-85, at 5. 
150. 15 U.S.c. §§ 771, 77q, 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-5 (2010). 
151. 15 U.S.c. § 77d(2). The issuer, however, bears the burden of establishing that the 
exemption is available for its private offering transaction, given the "broadly remedial 
purposes" of the statute. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953). 
152. See H.R. REp. No. 73-85, at 15-16 (exempting issuer transactions where the services 
of an underwriter are not used). A subsequent amendment excised the phrase "not 
with or through an underwriter" as superfluous language because the presence of an 
underwriter is the essence of a public offering. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
ch. 404, 48 Stat. 906; H.R. REp. No. 73-1838, at 41 (1934); see also Allen E. Throop 
& Chester T. Lane, Some Problems of Exemption Under the Securities Act of 1933,4 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 114 (1937) ("The registration and prospectus 
requirements relate only to distributions which are public in character."). 
153. Letter of General Counsel Discussing the Factors to Be Considered in Determining 
the Availability of the Exemption from Registration Provided by the Second Clause of 
Section 4(1), Securities Act Release No. 285, II Fed. Reg. 10,952 (Jan. 24,1935). 
154. 1d. (showing that other relevant factors were the number of offerees, number of units 
offered, and the size and manner ofthe offering). 
155. 1d. at 2. 
156. Id. 
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SEC v. Ralston Purina l57 is the seminal case to interpret the scope 
of the private-offering exemption. Pursuant to its policy of 
encouraging employee ownership of its common stock, Ralston 
Purina sold common stock to employees who had expressed an 
interest in acquiring the stock. 158 During a four-year period, the 
company sold shares to 1088 employees in over fifty widely 
dispersed communities. 159 The Commission sought to enjoin the 
company from offering its common stock without complying with the 
registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act. 160 
Ralston Purina claimed that its transactions were exempt from 
registration in reliance on the private-offering exemption of Section 
4(2) because all offerees were "key employees.,,161 The company 
asserted that its designation of key employees was not based solely 
upon an employee's status within the organizational chart, but also 
included other salient factors such as eligibility for promotion, ability 
to influence others, bearing a "special responsibility," or being 
"sympathetic to management,... ambitious,... and likely to be 
promoted to greater responsibility" by management. 162 In any event, 
the company's offerees included an artist, a chow-loading foreman, a 
copywriter, an electrician, a mill office clerk, a production trainee, a 
stenographer, and a veterinarian. 163 
The Supreme Court of the United States considered the legislative 
history in its interpretation of the private-offering exemption and 
noted that the exemption was intended for those transactions for 
which "there is no practical need ... for (the bill's) application.,,164 
Since the Securities Act established a disclosure-oriented registration 
regime for public offerings, the Court determined that the availability 
of the private-offering exemption should be based on "whether the 
particular class of persons affected need[ s] the protections of the Act. 
An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves 
is a transaction 'not involving any public offering. ",165 Finally, 
157. 346 u.s. 119 (1953). 
158. ld. at 121. Pursuant to the board resolution, the program was to be made available to 
those employees who exercised the initiative to inquire about purchasing the 
company's common stock, without solicitation by the company, its officers, or 
employees. [d. 
159. [d. Of an estimated 500 offers, 165 purchase applications were pending in 1951, 
when the Commission instituted litigation. ld. 
160. Id. at 119. 
161. ld. at 121. 
162. ld. at 121-22. 
163. Id. at 121. 
164. ld. at 124-25. 
165. [d. at 125. 
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although the Commission had "consistently interpreted" the private-
offering exemption as being unavailable for transactions involving "a 
large number of offerees," the Court declined to read into the statute 
any quantitative limitation. 166 
Based on this statutory interpretation, the Court considered the 
company's employees to be no less members of the public than their 
neighbors. 167 The Court ultimately determined that the company's 
offering must comply with the registration provisions of Section 5 
because there was no showing that these employees had "access" to 
the type of information that would have been provided in a Securities 
Act registration statement. 168 
However, the Court noted that special circumstances may warrant 
treating an offering to a particular class of employees as a private 
offering. 169 For example, an offering to a company's executives 
"who because of their position have access to the same kind of 
information that the act would make available in the form of a 
registration statement" would be one such special circumstance. 170 In 
its focus on the relationship between the company and the offerees, 
the Court adopted the "special relationship" factor of the 
Commission's general counsel. 171 Thus, as interpreted by the Court, 
Section 4(2) would provide an exemption for private offerings made 
by issuers to a particular class of persons (i.e., sophisticated 
investors) who have access to similar information as would be made 
available in a registered offering. 172 
Following adoption of the Securities Act, institutional investors 
(particularly insurance companies) and "a few closely related 
persons" providing capital to business ventures were among the types 
of sophisticated investors who traditionally participated in private 
166. Id. ("[N]othing prevents the commission, in enforcing the statute, from using some 
kind of numerical test in deciding when to investigate particular exemption claims."). 
167. Id. at 126. 
168. Id. at 127; see also Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 
1977) ("[A]ccess [to information means] a relationship based on factors such as 
employment, family, or economic bargaining power that enables the offeree 
effectively to obtain such information."). 
169. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 126. 
170. Id. at 125-26. 
171. Id. at 126 n.12 (quoting Letter of General Counsel Discussing the Factors to Be 
Considered in Determining the Availability of the Exemption from Registration 
Provided by the Second Clause of Section 4(1), Securities Act Release No. 285, 11 
Fed. Reg. 10,952 (Jan. 24, 1935). 
172. Id. at 127. 
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offerings. 173 The Commission created the concept of "accredited 
person" to provide issuers with an objective means to gauge the 
sophistication of an offeree or purchaser for purposes of the limited-
offering exemption of Section 3(b) of the Securities Act. 174 The 
issuer's ability to rely on the new rule was predicated on the issuer 
(or its agent) having a reasonable belief, after due inquiry, that the 
purchaser was an accredited person at the time of sale. 175 Accredited 
persons comprised three categories of investors: certain banks, 
insurance companies, investment companies, small business 
investment companies, and employee-benefit plans; any purchaser of 
at least $100,000 of securities sold by the issuer in reliance on Rule 
242; and an issuer's directors and executive officers. 176 
C. Accredited Investors 
In 1980, Congress amended the Securities Act, in part, to provide 
incentives for small business investment. 177 The amendments 
included a definition of "accredited investor" and enumerated certain 
institutions that would qualify as accredited investors 178 (these 
institutional investors were identical to those entities that were 
included in the accredited person definition of Rule 242).179 The 
statute also authorized the Commission to define accredited investors 
based on considerations such as a person's "financial sophistication, 
net worth, knowledge, and experience in financial matters, or amount 
of assets under management." 180 
The Commission used this rulemaking authority to promulgate 
Rule 501(a)181 of Regulation D,182 which set forth particular criteria 
173. Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 33-4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 
11,316 (Nov. 6, 1962); Letter of General Counsel, supra note 153. 
174. Exemption of Limited Offers and Sales by Qualified Issuers, Securities Act Release 
No. 33-6180,45 Fed. Reg. 6362,6363 (Jan. 28, 1980). Rule 242, which was intended 
to facilitate small business capital formation, was adopted as an experiment by the 
Commission. Id. The Commission announced its intention to evaluate Rule 242 
during the monitoring period, and determine whether to retain the Rule or revise the 
conditions for its use. Id. at 6362. 
175. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(a)(1) (1981). The issuer (or its agent) was required at the time of 
sale not only to believe that the purchaser was an accredited person, but to have 
reasonable grounds for its belief. Id. 
176. Id. § 230.242(a)(1 )(i)-(iii). 
177. Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275. 
178. Securities Act of 1933, IS U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15)(i) (2006). 
179. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(a)(1). 
180. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15)(ii). 
181. 17 C.F.R. § 230.50 I (a)(2009). 
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for determining whether specific categories of institutions or 
individuals would qualify as accredited investors. The Rule added 
the following entities to the statutory definition of accredited 
investor: private business development companies, tax-exempt 
entities with assets in excess of $5 million, and entities owned solely 
by accredited investors. 183 Categories of natural persons who 
likewise would qualify as accredited investors were based on either a 
special relationship with the issuer,184 net worth,185 or annual 
income. 186 
Consistent with the non-public nature of Section 4(2) offerings, 
general solicitation or general advertising is proscribed by Regulation 
D.187 Additionally, Rule 506 permits offerings to an unlimited 
number of accredited investors and up to thirty-five purchasers who 
have (or the issuer reasonably believes they have) the requisite 
expertise to evaluate the risks and merits of the proposed 
investment. 188 
182. See Revisions of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving 
Limited Offerings and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 
11251,11258 (Mar. 16, 1982) (Rule 506 of Regulation D provides a non-exclusive 
"safe harbor" that issuers may use to effect a private offering under Section 4(2)). 
183. Id. at 11253. In 1983, the entities that qualified as accredited investors were expanded 
to include certain savings and loan associations, insured credit unions, registered 
broker-dealers, and trusts, partnerships and corporations whose assets exceed $5 
million. Regulation D Revisions, Securities Act Release No. 33-6758, 53 Fed. Reg. 
7866,7866-67 (Mar. 10, 1988). 
184. This category would encompass the issuer's directors, executive officers, and general 
partners. Revisions from Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions 
Involving Limited Offerings and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, 47 Fed. 
Reg. 11251, 11254 (Mar. 16, 1982). 
185. This test established a minimum net worth of $1 million for a natural person 
(individually, or jointly with the person's spouse). Jd. at 11255. 
186. InitialIy, the income test required an individual to have a minimum annual income of 
$200,000 for each of the prior two years, and a reasonable expectation of at least 
$200,000 for the current year. Jd. at 11255. The income test subsequently was 
revised to incorporate income of one's spouse, thereby expanding the income 
threshold to $300,000. Regulation D Revisions, Securities Act Release No. 33-6758, 
53 Fed. Reg. 7866, 7867 (Mar. 10, 1988). The Commission also rescinded the 
accredited investor standard available for a purchaser of a significant dollar amount of 
securities. Jd. Under the "purchaser test," one would be required to purchase a 
minimum of $150,000 of securities where the total purchase price would not exceed 
20% of the purchaser's net worth (individually, or jointly with the purchaser's spouse) 
at the time of purchase. Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for 
Transactions Involving Limited Offerings and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-
6389,47 Fed. Reg. 11251, 11254 (Mar. 16, 1982). 
187. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2010). 
188. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(e), 230.506(b)(2) (2010). 
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Indicia of investor sophistication include wealth, business 
experience, and financial acumen. 189 Given their wealth and their 
knowledge of business and financial matters, sophisticated investors 
are considered to have the ability to "fend for themselves,"19o and 
thus have "no practical need" for the protection that a registered 
offering would provide. 191 
D. Policy Considerations 
Certainly, the magnitude of losses to public investors and the 
collapse of confidence in U.S. capital markets following the 1929 
Stock Market Crash justified a reliance on disclosure to cure the 
deficiencies in the new issues market. l92 To the extent that 
sophisticated investors were thought to have a special relationship 
with issuers, or to have sufficient skills, resources, or bargaining 
strength vis-a-vis issuers to see after their own interests, there was no 
practical need for a federal statute to give these investors essentially 
similar information about the securities that they could readily 
procure for themselves. 193 The net result was that government 
oversight focused on disclosures made in public distributions of 
securities rather than transactions 194 with those who have the ability 
to fend for themselves. 195 As a consequence, rather than rely on 
government oversight of disclosure 10 private offerings, 196 
189. 15 u.s.c. § 77b(a)(l5)(ii) (2006); see also Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d 
893, 902 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that Doran's specialized education as a petroleum 
engineer, estimated net worth of $1 million, and oil and gas investment portfolio 
valued at $850,000 evidenced his investment sophistication). 
190. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). 
191. Id. at 124-25. 
192. See supra Part II.A and accompanying notes. 
193. See supra Part II.B (discussing The Securities Act of 1933 as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court in Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119). 
194. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
195. See Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 125; Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail 
Investors, and the Institutionalization o/the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 
1064 (2009). From one perspective, the ability to bear "losses" identifies that class of 
investors for whom the protections of the securities laws are not needed. See, e.g., id. 
at 1064 ("[Wealthy and diversified institutional investors] can and do suffer from 
issuer concealment, but rarely drastically. As such, they can more easily be told 
simply to learn from the experience, not repeat the mistake, and seek damages if fraud 
can be proven."). 
196. See Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The Act is 
practical and pragmatic, not dogmatic and doctrinaire. It is designed to give a panoply 
of protection to the investor, but also to allow play in the marts of trade for offers of 
securities that do not require the oversight of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. "). 
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sophisticated investors became, in effect, a proxy for direct 
government regulation. 197 For those investors who participate in 
private offerings of securities by issuers who are not subject to the 
annual and periodic reporting requirements of the Securities Act, 198 
they implicitly accept the risk of a lack of prescribed disclosures and 
lack of transparency199 that is characteristic of publicly held issuers. 
Again, given the sophistication of these investors, they are left to 
their own devices to bargain for the type of information about their 
investment and timing of that disclosure that would be acceptable to 
them. 
IV. THE LIMITS OF THE SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR 
OVERSIGHT MODEL 
What the Madoff fraud seemingly exposed was an astonishing lack 
of critical diligence by numerous sophisticated investors. 200 Given 
the vast sums invested with Madoff, these investors had every 
incentive-and the means-to look after their own interests, whether 
they were acting in a fiduciary capacity or on their own behalves. 201 
Nonetheless, a number of them seemed unable or unwilling to fend 
for themselves. 
Although the Commission has taken a number of steps to rectify 
weaknesses in its enforcement and inspection programs 202 and 
instituted reforms that address, inter alia, a lack of structural controls 
that Madoff exploited to the detriment of his investors,203 the question 
197. See Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 125, 127. 
198. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (2006). 
199. For example, the MD&A requirements of Regulation S-K, Item 303, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.303 (2009), are "intended to give the investor an opportunity to look at the 
company through the eyes of management by providing both a short and long-term 
analysis of the [company's business]." Concept Release on Management's Discussion 
and Analysis of Financial Condition and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 
6,711,52 Fed. Reg. 13717 (Apr. 24,1987). 
200. See infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text. 
201. See supra notes 11,59-60 and accompanying text. 
202. The Securities and Exchange Commission Post-MadofJ Reforms, SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM'N, http://sec.gov/spotlightlsecpostmadoffreforms.htm (last modified Dec. 7, 
2009). 
203. An example of a structural reform was the "expan[sion of] protections" for clients 
when the Commission "eliminate[d] certain exemptions" in Rule 206(4)-2 under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by 
Investment Advisers, Release No. IA-2968, 75 Fed. Reg. 1456, 1456 (Jan. 11,2010). 
As part of its regulatory response to Madoff's Ponzi scheme, the Commission 
amended rule 206(4)-2, which became effective on March 12,2010, that subjects any 
registered investment adviser who, in its capacity as a qualified custodian, maintains 
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still remains: Why was there an apparent failure to perform the 
diligence that first and foremost was in investors' economic 
interests? 
A. Diligence by Madoff Investors 
"Remember, 0 Stranger, Arithmetic IS the first of the 
sciences and the mother of safety.,,204 
t Louis D. Brandeis 
'''It's very easy if you want [to discover a Ponzi scheme]. 
You must do a third party [sic] check. It's absolutely a 
must. ... It's Accounting 101 to look at [Depository Trust 
Company], do a box count' if you are looking for a Ponzi 
scheme.,,205 
t Bernard L. Madoff 
custody of client assets to an annual surprise examination (or audit) of client assets 
(the "MadoffRule"). The surprise examination must be conducted by an independent 
public accounting that is subject to regulation by the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB"). Id. at 1457. The adviser also would be subject to a 
surprise examination if its client's assets were held by any of the adviser's related 
persons, and the related person must furnish to the adviser a report on its internal 
controls for its custodial operations that was prepared by an accounting firm regulated 
by PCAOB. Id. An adviser that is subject to surprise examination may furnish 
account statements to its clients. Id. Where client assets are held by a qualified 
custodian (i.e., a bank, registered broker-dealer, or registered futures commission 
merchant), the adviser is required to have a "reasonable belief that the qualified 
custodian sends account statements directly to advisory clients." Id. at 1456; see also 
Staff Responses to Questions About the Custody Rule, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investmenticustodyjaCL030510.htm (last modified 
Sept. 9, 2010). Notwithstanding the Commission's rulemaking, Congress also 
amended the Advisers Act to mandate that registered investment advisers "safeguard 
client assets" pursuant to rules adopted by the Commission. Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 411,124 Stat. 1376, 
1577 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (to be codified at 15 U.S.c. § SOb-lSb). 
Section 412 of the Dodd-Frank Act also requires the Comptroller General of the 
United States to assess compliance costs of the Commission's custody rule and costs 
associated with the elimination of the Commission's "operational independence" 
provision. Id. In written testimony to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, Professor John Coffee stated that Section 411 would "eliminate[ ] 
the ability of the manager to recycle' [sic] funds from new to old investors." S. REP. 
No. 111-176, at 77 (2010) (citations omitted). 
204. Norman Hapgood, Preface to LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 142, at xli (citing a 
private letter Mr. Brandeis sent to him with a suggested "epitaph or obituary notice" 
for Mr. Mellen of the New Haven Railroad). 
205. Interview of Bernard L. Madoff, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 7, http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/studiesI2009/oig-509/exhibit-0 1 04.pdf (last visited January 6, 2011). 
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"All it took was simple math-'What's the open interest of 
the S&P 100 option, and how many trades does he say he's 
making?' ,,206 
tloe Kinahan 
255 
Apparently, a number of sophisticated individual or institutional 
investors-or professional money managers acting on their 
behalves-may have conducted, at most, pro forma diligence on 
Madoffs investment program before tendering millions-and 
sometimes billions-of dollars to him to invest for them or their 
clients. 207 Investors or their professional money managers may not 
have adequately scrutinized Madoffs investment program for any 
number of reasons. Madoffs prominence on Wall Street may have 
obviated the need to conduct customary diligence. 208 Years of steady 
"investment returns" may have lulled investors into disregarding 
potentially troubling signs. 209 The aura of exclusivity that Madoff 
cultivated among his investors, together with his social prominence 
206. Rob Curran, Traders Say MadojJ's Strategy Was Unworkable, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 
2008, at C5 (quoting the chief derivatives strategist as think-or-swim). 
207. See MadofJ's Victims, supra note 11. Of course, fund managers profited handsomely 
from management fees paid by fund investors. See Gauthier-Villars, supra note 48, at 
Cl (stating that the Luxalpha Sicav fund assessed a '''hurdle' fee of 5%, a 
performance fee of 16%, and an annual management fee of 0.8%"); Lauricella, supra 
note 89, at B2 (stating that investors reportedly paid in the aggregate about $790 
million in management fees.); see also Show Them the Money, supra note 101, at 5 
("Bernard Madoff pleaded guilty to running a Ponzi scheme in which he was paying 
early investors consistent returns by taking the money from later ones, with potential 
losses in the tens of billions of dollars. Just what were wealth managers doing to earn 
their fees if they could not spot the scam?"). 
208. See Gregory Zuckerman & David Gauthier-Villars, A Lonely Lament From a Whistle-
Blower: Mr. Markopolos Regrets His Failure to Persuade Investors; Tips for the SEC, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2009, at C3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article 
ISB123361899636241467.html (stating that Madoffwas not subjected to International 
Advisors LLC's customary due diligence "to the same rigor, in part because of Mr. 
Madoffs reputation on Wall Street"); Strasburg, supra note 59, at Cl ("Mr. Madoffs 
'background, his associations' were reasons for comfort, Mr. Kaufman said."). 
209. Con of the Century, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18,2008, at 119-20 ("Clients ... seemed not to 
mind [being kept in the dark] as long as the returns remained strong, accepting that to 
ask Bernie to reveal his strategy would be as crass as demanding to see Coca-Cola's 
magic formula."); Greenspan, supra note 16, at WI ("Highly compensated [fund 
managers] ... had too good a thing going to entertain the idea that it might all be 
about to crumble."); The Grand Illusion, ECONOMIST, Mar. 7,2009, at 79 (stating that 
Madoffs "smooth returns" should have aroused suspicions). 
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and recognition as a philanthropist also may have been factors. 210 
Other investors took comfort either from "verifying" that the 
Commission's staff "had no issues or concerns with" Madoff211 or 
from reading unspecified "SEC reports" on Madoff. 212 
It appears that Madoff was less than cooperative with investors or 
potential investors who sought to perform a more searching diligence 
on the investment. 213 Madoff reportedly rebuffed the efforts of an 
institutional investor who sought greater insight into the "options-
based investment strategy,,214 that was integral to Madoffs system. 215 
Madoff reportedly not only maintained a level of secrecy about his 
investment activities, but also insisted that his investors likewise 
remain behind a veil of secrecy. According to one investment 
manager, Madoff said, "If you invest with me, you must never tell 
anyone that you're invested with me. It's no one's business what 
210. Greenspan, supra note 16, at W2 ("Newspaper reports described how wealthy retirees 
in Florida joined Mr. Madoffs country club for the sole reason of having an 
opportunity to meet him socially and be invited to invest directly with him .... [T]hat 
Mr. Madoff was a prominent Jewish philanthropist was undoubtedly another 
situational contributor."). 
211. Transmittal Letter and Exhibits, supra note 10, at 56 ("We contacted the SEC on 
several occasions and they verified there were no issues or concerns with Madoffs 
firm and everything was above board."); SEC, supra note 114 (showing that Madoff 
ensured that wavering prospects knew that the Commission's staff had examined and 
investigated him and his affiliates and had not detected any fraud, which allayed 
concerns that prospective investors raised in their diligence of the investment). 
212. Transmittal Letter and Exhibits, supra note 10 ("[I] read the [SEC] report on madoff 
and entrusted him with my [IRA)."). 
213. See irifra note 214 and accompanying text. 
214. Erin E. Arvelund, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Bernie Madoffis So Secretive, He Even Asks 
Investors To Keep Mum, BARRON'S, May 7, 2001, at 26, available at 
http://barrons.com/article/SB989019667829349012.html. One hedge fund reportedly 
described Madoffs "split strike conversion" strategy as follows: 
Id. 
Typically, a position will consist of the ownership of 30-35 S&P 
100 stocks, most correlated to that index, the sale of out-of-the-
money calls on the index and the purchase of out-of-the-money 
puts on the index. The sale of the calls is designed to increase the 
rate of return, while allowing upward movement of the stock 
portfolio to the strike price of the calls. The puts, funded in large 
part by the sale of the calls, limit the portfolio's downside. 
215. Aaron Lucchetti & Jenny Strasburg, Simon's Notion: All In, Then All Out, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 25, 2009, at Cl, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl23553 
339326867241.html (reporting that, according to a member of Stony Brook University 
Foundation's investment committee, during their 1993 visit to Madoffs midtown 
Manhattan office, "Madoff didn't want to discuss details of his options-based 
investment strategy, but that didn't raise any immediate alarms" because their 
confidence was assuaged by "Madoffs electronically savvy trading desk."). 
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goes on here."ZI6 In other instances, Madoff reportedly did not pennit 
certain inquisitive investors to participate in his investment 
programZI7 or expelled those investors who asked "awkward 
questions. "Z18 
However, an attorney for a prominent money manager alleged that 
his client's efforts to conduct diligence were "thwarted by the 
intricate, fraudulent scheme perpetrated by Madoff."zI9 According to 
Fairfield Greenwich, Madoff deceived the fund's management and 
supplied its representatives with "falsified trading documents."zzo 
In some cases, investors may have allowed the perceived 
exclusivity of being a Madoff investor, ZZI seemingly implausible 
investment returns "with limited risk,,,m or belief that Madoff had 
special access or market knowledge from which they could benefit223 
to obscure tripwires about Madoff and his investment program. Z24 
216. Arvelund, supra note 214, at 26 ("When he couldn't explain ... how they were up or 
down in a particular month ... I pulled the money out."); see also Con of the Century, 
supra note 209, at 119 ("Turning away some investors and telling those he accepted 
not to talk to outsiders produced a sense of exclusivity."). 
217. Robert Frank & Tom Lauricella, 'Uncle Bernie' and His Angry Clients-Madoff 
Created Air of Mystery, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2008, at AI, available at 
http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SBI22973208705022949.html(''[Madoft] could be gruff 
to the people who gave him money to invest, threatening to expel those who asked too 
many questions."). 
218. Con of the Century, supra note 209, at 120 ("Madoff reinforced the message by 
occasionally ejecting a client who asked awkward questions."); see also Dumb Money 
and Dull Diligence, supra note 60 ("His clients were fiercely loyal; they had to be or 
he would cut them out of his hallowed investment circle and month-after-month 
returns of metronomic regularity. And he thrived in an era of cheap credit, when 
greed and gullibility became far more powerful than fear and suspicion."). 
219. Rappaport, supra note 89, at AI. 
220. Tom Lauricella, Fairfield Greenwich Says Madoff Provided Bad Data, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 2, 2009, at C2 (stating that, according to Fairfield Greenwich, some of the phony 
trading documents included "fake electronic records from Depository Trust & 
Clearing Corp., an independent firm that inventories much of Wall Street's stock and 
bond holdings"); see also SEC, supra note 114, at 22 (showing that OIG confirmed 
that Madoff"kept two sets of records"). 
221. See Excerpts: 'We Have Been Very Affected At A Family Level'-Piedrahita on 
Piedrahita, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2009), http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SBI2384 
4004768970611.html ("Sometimes [Madoft] would take money and sometimes not. 
He created a line of people who wanted in."). 
222. Information, supra note 8, IJIJ 3, 8 (alleging that Madoff promised some investors 
returns of at least 46%). 
223. See Masters, supra note 49 ("Several investors believed he might be front-running-
illegally trading ahead of customers of the market-making division-but many stayed 
with him anyway. 'He had a clean record from the SEC and it wasn't our job to spot 
this,' says one."); Gauthier-Villars, supra note 48, at Cl (referring to a prospectus by 
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The enforcement and inspection lapses of the Commission's staff 
concerning Madoff are well-documented in the OIG's report. 225 
However, the Commission staffs mistakes should not inculcate 
money managers or other sophisticated investors from the products of 
their diligence on the Madoff investment. After all, the basis on 
which money managers seek to attract assets under management is 
the reputed financial and investment expertise of the particular 
money manager. 
Many of the same "red flags" raised with the Commission 
concerning Madoff were no less present in the case of sophisticated 
investors,226 who were investing millions (and in some cases billions) 
with Madoff. 227 For example, the financial statements were not 
audited by a firm of nationally recognized auditors, but by an 
otherwise obscure U.S. accounting firm that provided financial 
auditing services for Madoff. 228 
Madoff reportedly described his firm's role as one of providing 
investment ideas and executing trades in its capacity as a securities 
broker,229 but Mr. Picard stated Madoffs firm apparently had not 
"bought any securities for clients in at least [thirteen] years.,,230 If 
Madoff was just a broker, there are risk management controls 
available to institutional investors. For example, they could arrange 
to have their securities and cash positions transferred to an 
independent third-party custodian of their choice rather than keep 
the Luxalpha fund which described Madoff indirectly as a "prominent New York 
broker ... [whose] large volume of trades ... allowed him to anticipate market 
movements by one or two hours and bet in the right direction 95% of the time."). 
224. See Zuckerman & Gauthier-Villars, supra note 208, at C3 ("Part of the reason he did 
not press his warnings: Fear of retribution by Mr. Madoff, says Mr. Markopolos."); 
Can of the Century, supra note 209 ("On the face of it, the attractions were clear. 
Mr[.] Madoff's pedigree was top-notch: a pioneering marketmaker, he had chaired 
NASDAQ, had advised the government on market issues and was a noted 
philanthropist."). 
225. See SEC, supra note 114. 
226. See Dugan & Crawford, supra note 113, at C 1. 
227. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
228. See Dugan & Crawford, supra note 113, at Cl (reporting that accountants who 
inspected the books of Madoff or his feeder funds may be "vulnerable to claims they 
should have uncovered red flags."). 
229. Michael Ocrant, Madoff Tops Charts; Skeptics Ask How, MAR/HEDGE (RIP), May 
2001, at 1, 2. In this case, the investment strategy was a collar (i.e., put and call 
options) on multiple portfolios comprised of thirty to thirty-five stocks with a high 
correlation to the S&P 100 index. ld. at I. 
230. Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Madoff Didn't Buy Securities for Years, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 
2009, at 83. 
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those positions in brokerage accounts at Madoff s firm. 231 This 
probably would have exposed "phony trades" in real time-or more 
likely, would have dissuaded Madoff from attempting a fraudulent 
scheme that could be so readily detected. They also could arrange to 
receive confirmations of purchases and sales of common stock made 
for their accoune32 via the DTC Institutional Delivery System, which 
has been available for institutional accounts for over thirty years233 
rather than solely from a brokerage firm. 
Some Wall Street professionals had expressed "astonish[ment]" at 
Madoffs "ability to time the market and move to cash in the 
underlying securities before market conditions tum negative ... [and] 
buy and sell the underlying stocks without noticeably affecting the 
market.,,234 What efforts were made to understand Madoffs option 
strategy, or at least question the viability of the strategy if like results 
could not be replicated by Madoffs investors who had the personnel 
and other resources to engage in sophisticated investment analysis?235 
The "shallow volume" in S&P lOa options contracts also should have 
caused investors to question Madoffs strategy.236 What further 
diligence or other action did sophisticated investors take when the 
MAR/Hedge report and the Barron's article237 were published in May 
2001? 
But Madoff was not just a broker-he was an investment advisor 
for a hedge fund. Diligence becomes more acute in a structure where 
the investment advisor has custody of the fund's cash, securities, and 
other assets; directs trades to the advisor's affiliated broker; self-
clears trades; and does not use a well-known independent auditor. 238 
231. See Ocrant, supra note 229, at 1-2. 
232. 17 CFR § 240.1 Ob-1 0 (2010). 
233. Depositary Trust Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 80,884 (Nov. 29, 1974). 
234. See Ocrant, supra note 229, at 2-3. Most of these financial professionals were 
"barned" by Madoffs "consistent, nonvolatile returns month after month and year 
after year." Id. at l. 
235. See id. at 2-3. 
236. Curran, supra note 206, at C5. While Madoffwas believed to manage $50 billion of 
assets using his proprietary options strategy, the entire S&P 100 options would have 
protected only $3.25 billion of stock as of the end of November 2008. However, 
based on FactSet data, the "open interest in S&P 100 contracts showed that nobody 
owns more than 6,000 contracts at any single strike price." Id. 
237. See Arvelund, supra note 214, at 26. 
238 See Sec. Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re Bernard 
L. MadoffInv. Sec, LLC), 424 B.R. 122, 126-29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (describing 
the BLMIS structure and customer agreement); Dumb Money and Dull Diligence, 
supra note 60 ("Yet for all [hedge fund managers') insights and access, some of them 
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Ultimately, why did they invest with Madoff even in the absence of 
reasonable transparency by Madoff in his activities with their money 
or their clients' money?239 Conversely, how many smaller, albeit 
accredited, investors who reportedly invested their life savings with 
Madoff would recognize the significance of "red flags" (e.g., would 
know to ask questions about the independence of the auditor)? 
This seemingly massive failure of sophisticated investors to 
leverage their financial expertise and wealth to ferret out material 
information on Madoff s investment program suggests that continued 
reliance on sophisticated investor status as a basis for exemption from 
Securities Act registration may be misplaced as a legislative policy 
matter because it appears that many of Madoffs sophisticated 
investors either were unable or unwilling to fend for themselves. 240 
B. Investors Who Peered Beneath the Surface 
Sophisticated investors were not uniform in their regard for 
Madoffs program, and Markopolos reportedly was not alone in his 
distrust of Madoffs strategy. In one instance, a hedge fund manager 
who sat on the board of a charity reportedly convinced fellow trustees 
to withdraw the charity's investment from Madoffs program when 
his staff could not replicate Madoffs strategy.241 The OIG noted that 
several private parties who conducted diligence on Madoffs program 
ultimately determined not to invest with Madoff after their diligence 
"revealed numerous and significant red flags and concerns. ,,242 These 
parties generally focused on fairly basic documentation, such as 
missed red flags billowing over Mr[.] Madoff's business, such as the way he kept 
custody over his clients' accounts, handled the trades himself and employed an 
obscure accounting firm. They ignored warnings from lesser mortals, such as one in 
2001 from MAR/Hedge, a diligent trade journal. They never wondered why, though 
the sums he managed were vast, he rarely caused a ripple in the markets."). 
239. See Arvelund, supra note 214, at 26. 
240. Some potential investors examining Madoff's program more likely smelled not the 
sweetness of a rose. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIETTE act 2, sc. 2 
("What's in a name? That which we call a rose By any other name would smell as 
sweet."); see Zuckerman & Gauthier-Villars, supra note 208, at C3 ("[Harry] 
Markopolos says he told [certain investors] that he thought Mr. Madoff was a fraud. 
He regrets he could not persuade many of them."); Masters, supra note 49 ("Two 
fellow trustees of an educational institution where [Madoft] sat on the board say they 
had long had reservations about his reported returns. However, they did not speak up 
and made no effort to prevent the school from investing with him. 'I thought he might 
be front-running [a form of insider dealing involving trade placed right before big 
orders] or something dubious like that-I never would have thought he was just 
inventing the whole thing,' says one."). 
241. See Masters, supra note 49. 
242. SEC, supra note 114, at412. 
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financial statements and trading records, and considered concepts like 
independence and transparency. 243 According to one investment-
advisory-firm official whose firm conducted diligence on Madoff for 
numerous clients, "there was a preponderance of suspicion among 
hedge fund industry insiders that something was awry at Madoff 
Securities. ,,244 
Madoffs consistent investment returns strained credulity of a fund 
of funds official with extensive options' experience because "[y]ou 
can construct [an options] strategy ... where you'll make money 
most of the time but you cannot construct a strategy where you make 
money all of the time.,,245 
C. Diligence on Private Offerings 
There is no definitive data on the size of the U.S. private offering 
market or on the size of Regulation D offerings, according to the 
Office of Inspector Genera1. 246 However, the OIG estimated the size 
of the Regulation D market for 2008 at $609 billion. 247 The OIG also 
observed that small issuers reported $1.2 trillion of unregistered 
securities offerings in the period of January 2000 to March 2001. 248 
243. ld. 
244. Jd. This finn employed an "iterative multi-phased" approach to due diligence, in 
contrast to a "check-the-box" methodology, and interviewed people at all levels of the 
fund. ld. 
245. ld. at 414. This official's finn also compared a sample of trades with activity in the 
market, and noticed that "the purchases were at or close to the lows of the day, and the 
sales were at or close to the highs of the day"-a virtual impossibility. ld. 
246. SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REpORT No. 459, REGULATION D EXEMPTION 
PROCESS 2 n.lS (2009). 
247. ld. at 2. OlG's estimate was based on the "average capital amount" sought to be 
raised by issuers who filed 323 electronic Regulation D filings between September 15, 
200S, and December 31, 200S. The average capital amount was then multiplied by 
the total number of Regulation D filings in 200S. According to Thomson Reuters, 
approximately $4.134 trillion in proceeds were raised in private offerings of securities 
from 2005 through the first half of 2009. Archives Quarterly Reviews. THOMSON 
REUTERS, http://online.thomsomeuters.comlDealsIntelligencelReviewsAndAnalysisl 
ArchiveQuarterlyReviews (last visited Jan 6, 2011) (create account; access Debt & 
Equity US Private Placement Review Table ALl Overall Private Placements for 4Q 
2006, 4Q 2007, 4Q 200S, 2Q 2009; contact analyst for 4Q 2005) (data gathered from 
a survey of Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Barclays Capital, JP Morgan, Goldman 
Sachs & Co., and other lead agents). In contrast, $699 billion of securities were 
registered with the Commission during fiscal years 2005-2009 (the government's 
fiscal year ends September 30th). 2009 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N PERFORMANCE 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REpORT at 42 fig.2.23 (2009), available at 
http://sec.gov/about/secpar2009.shtml. 
24S. SEC, supra note 246, at 3 & n.l9. 
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As noted earlier, about $25 billion of "worthless securities" were 
offered in the period 1919-1929/49 which would be worth 
approximately $3.5 trillion in 2008. 250 If one compares the average 
of $2.5 billion for one year during the decade preceding the 1929 
Stock Market Crash, the resulting amounts in 2008 would be $348 
billion/51 or a little over one half of the estimated $609 billion of 
Regulation D offerings for 2008. 252 
Looking beyond the Madoff offerings to the broader private 
offering market, is the type of diligence reportedly conducted by 
certain Madoff investors typical for sophisticated investors-
particularly institutional investors-in evaluating their initial 
investment and continuing participation in private offerings 
generally? 253 Or did this episode represent just an aberration, a 
momentary lapse in discipline that is unlikely to be repeated? Are the 
financial thresholds for individual accredited investor status a 
meaningful gauge of the individual's sophistication for Rule 506 or 
the private-offering exemption afforded by Section 4(2), which is the 
underlying statutory authority for the Rule? If sophisticated investors 
lack the discipline, the ability, or the power to perform something 
other than cursory diligence, do the policy bases for the Section 4(2) 
exemption have any continuing validity? In other words, does an 
exemption that originally reflected a legislative judgment that 
sophisticated investors do not have any practical need for the 
protections of registration--or that the benefits of registration would 
be too remote-continue to justify a policy choice that federal 
government resources should not be devoted to reviewing private 
offering documents for adequacy of disclosure? Ultimately, are 
sophisticated investors implicitly relying on the government to 
protect them as a "backstop" to their otherwise cursory diligence? 
D. Factors that Impact Decision-Making 
Among Madoffs individual investors were retirees, celebrities, and 
widows. 254 The financial sophistication of these individual investors 
generally is a far cry from the ranks of some market professionals-
such as hedge fund managers, executives and economists of 
249. H.R. REp. No. 85, at 2 (1933). 
250. Six Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a u.s. Dollar Amount, 1774 to Present, 
supra note 61 (calculated based on the relative share of Gross Domestic Product). 
251. ld. 
252. SEC, OFFICE OF AUDITS, REpORT No. 450, REGULATION D EXEMPTION PROCESS v 
(2009). 
253. See supra notes 208, 213-15 and accompanying text. 
254. See supra notes 59, 63-65 and accompanying text. 
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prominent financial services firms, etc.-who also reportedly were 
among Madoff's investors. 255 In this instance, market 
professionals-both those who invested personal funds and those 
who invested their clients' funds-seemingly fared no better than 
individual investors (some of whom probably were accredited 
investors) who generally lack the sophistication of professionals in 
evaluating investment products and executing trading strategies. 256 
Nonetheless, when investment vehicles like Long Term Capital 
Managemene57 implode, or investment scams like Madoff's Ponzi 
scheme collapse, the public disclosure of sophisticated money 
managers and investors (the "smart-money") among the ruins tends 
to expose sophisticated investors' decision-making and financial 
acumen to external scrutiny. 258 
Irrespective of whether investors are sophisticated or not, investors' 
decisions typically are influenced by factors other than purely 
technical knowledge and analysis of facts related to particular 
investment instruments or opportunities. 259 While it is expected that 
sophisticated investors will seek to advance their particular interests, 
the rationality of their investment decisions260 often is subject to 
biases that affect individual choices. 261 Moreover, as some Madoff 
255. See Madoffs Victims, supra note 11. 
256. See, e.g., id.; see also Jason Zweig, Where Ezra Merkin Lost His Way, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 10, 2009, at B 1. The Ascot Partners hedge fund, for example, invested nearly all 
of its $1.8 billion in assets with Madoff. Id.; see also Searcey & Efrati, supra note 48, 
at Al (stay-at-home mother in Tampa, Florida, lost "her children's nest egg"). 
257. Mitchell Pacelle & Anita Raghavan, Long-Term Capital Investors, Lenders Demand 
Answers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1998, at A8. 
258. This skepticism about the quality of sophisticated investors' decision-making recurs 
periodically. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 195, at 1061 ("Does what we know 
about the behavior of institutional investment managers suggest that they act 
consistently in the diligent, rational manner we would expect from educated, high1y-
incentivized people who are engaged in repeat-play activities?"). 
259. See Martin Sewell, Behavioural Finance, 1 (Apr. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
http:\\behaviouralfinance.netlbehavioural-finance.pdf ("Behavioural finance ... helps 
explain why and how markets might be inefficient."). 
260. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (7th ed. 2007) ("Behavior is 
rational when it conforms to the model of rational choice, whatever the state of mind 
of the chooser. "). 
261. These biases, which reflect "systematic departures from rationality," include the sunk 
costs fallacy, the endowment effect, and hyperbolic discounting. Id. at 17; 
Langevoort, supra note 195, at 1046 (asking whether the Commission's mission 
should include "debiasing" investors). One convicted fraudster observed that some 
investors are susceptible to appeals to their desire to do the deal, almost to the point of 
an "addiction." Glenn Ruffenach, Encore (A Special Report)-Confessions of a Scam 
264 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 40 
investors seemingly demonstrated, a marquee name may be all the 
comfort some investors seek. 262 
Finally, investors' decisions often are heavily influenced by the 
level of trust they repose in persons or parties to the proposed 
transaction and in securities markets generally. 263 Although trust is 
Artist, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2004, at RI (stating that these "personality traits" 
typically are exhibited by individuals in their 50s and wealthy entrepreneurs). 
262. See Romy Vargese & Kellie Geressy-Nilsen, Investors Tap Berkshire. Kraft, WALL 
ST. 1., Feb. 4, 2010, at C7 ('''For many investors, knowing that Warren Buffett is 
behind the offering is about all the research he or she may need to do when 
considering this deal,' according to Margie Patel, a senior portfolio manager at 
Evergreen Investments .... "). Debt holders and shareholders do not share mutuality 
of interests, given the priority that debt holders have upon any liquidation of the 
company. Thus, as the company's lenders, debt holders' diligence necessarily must 
extend beyond the name, as they seek to determine what covenants and other 
contractual restrictions (if any) would be appropriate for the risk they have assumed in 
the purchase of an issuer's debt securities. Mr. Buffet wants new shareholders and 
"Berkshire veterans" alike to "understand Berkshire's operations, goals, limitations, 
and culture," and encourages shareholders to read "the economic principles that guide 
[Charlie Munger and him]." Letter from Warren E. Buffet, Chairman of the Bd., 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 3 (Feb. 26, 
2010), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2009Itr.pdf; see also 
WARREN E. BUFFET, AN OWNER'S MANUAL (2010), available at 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/ownman.pdf Debt holders, likewise, would be 
well-served to conduct proper diligence in accordance with their economic interests. 
In this instance, the indenture for the senior unsecured debt securities did not provide 
for significant restrictions on Berkshire's activities or operations. See BERKSHIRE 
HATHAWAY INC. & BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY FINANCE CORP., SECURITIES REGISTRATION 
STATEMENT (FORM S-3), exhibit 4.1, at 13 (Feb. I, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/datalI067983/000119312510017756/dex41.htm. 
While Letters to Shareholders and the "owners' manual" offer insight into Berkshire 
management's philosophy and practices, debt holders ultimately can enforce only 
those particular rights and restrictions set forth in the indenture, which forms their 
contract with the obligor(s) on the debt securities. Felicia Smith, Applicability of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 to Consent Solicitations to 
Amend Trust Indentures, 35 How. L.J. 343,345 (1992) ("[I]f one lesson can be drawn 
from the RJR scenario, it is that bondholders enjoy no greater rights or protections 
than those specifically enumerated by the terms of the trust indenture under which the 
bonds were issued. . .. This is not a new lesson, but one that has tended to be 
overlooked by investors in investment-grade debt."). 
263. President Roosevelt stressed a need to restore investor confidence as a reason for the 
legislation that eventually was enacted as the Securities Act. H.R. Doc. No. 73-12, at 
I (1933) ("It should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring 
back public confidence."); see also Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O'Hara, A Cognitive 
Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 1717, 1754 (2006) ("[W]here the law seeks to 
encourage trust, it does so by reducing the risk to parties of trusting one another 
sufficiently that they are willing to expose themselves to some level of vulnerability .. 
.. [But] where more careful assessments are desirable, as parties interact more, they 
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an indispensable factor in U.S. securities trading markets, it is neither 
indiscriminate nor blind. For example, U.S. daily trading volume on 
the New York Stock Exchange was 2.3 billion shares in 2008. 264 
Modem securities trading markets function effectively because the 
trust that makes them possible is undergirded with a regulatory 
infrastructure that protects the legitimate expectations of the parties 
that each will obtain the benefit of the bargain: namely that the buyer 
will tender the cash consideration and the seller will tender the 
quantity of common stock or other securities, respectively, at the 
contract price on the date the trade is required to be completed. 265 
This largely anonymous market transaction-in that buyer and seller 
are unlikely to know the identity of the other-processed by any 
number of intermediaries (brokers, dealers, securities exchanges, or 
clearing firms) also is highly regulated and transparent, and the risk 
of failures to settle trades is not a significant problem. 266 
Consequently, the seller will not receive payment for securities that 
are not delivered, and the buyer will not receive securities for which 
full payment is not made. 267 
However, this trust does not necessarily translate to the largely 
unregulated contractual relationships that underlie private 
placements. In those settings, the sophisticated investor can bargain 
for the level of information (or disclosure) he considers appropriate 
both for his initial investment decision as well as that which would be 
acceptable as long as he is an investor. 268 If the issuer is a public 
reporting entity, the investor also can avail himself of the annual, 
periodical, and current public disclosure reports mandated by the 
Securities Act, which generally requires disclosure of important 
acquire more trust-relevant information, determining for themselves optimal levels of 
specific trust and distrust. "). 
264. NYSE EURONEXT, ANNUAL REPORT, FORM 10-K, at 4 (Feb. 27, 2009), available at 
http://ir.nyse.comlphoenix.zhtml?c= 12 9 145 &p=irol-reportsAnnual. 
265. See generally 15 V.S.c. §§ 78k, 78k-l, 78q-1 (2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.600-12; 
Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations 
Regarding Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1500-()2 (2002) (arguing that 
securities market is efficient because "legal sanctions support a vital process of trust 
building"). 
266. According to data from The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, since 2005 at 
least 98% of transaction dollars were settled on time. SEC, supra note 246, at 40 
fig.2.20. 
267. JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, BARRON'S FINANCE & INVESTMENT 
HANDBOOK 401 (7th ed. 2007). 
268. Prentice, supra note 265, at 1444 (stating that sophisticated investors can choose to 
"bargain for lots of information, some information, or no information"). 
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infonnation on the issuer's business activities, financial position, and 
management. 269 However, in the absence of an issuer's obligation to 
make public disclosure, the investor's ability to obtain material 
infonnation on his investment with some regularity (whether 
quarterly, annually, or both), or upon specified events, becomes more 
cri ti cal. 270 
To the extent sophisticated investors substitute trust for diligence, 
they should bear the risks-including loss of investment principal-
associated with their decisions. Indeed, there are instances where 
mutual convenience or course of dealing may obviate concerns about 
potential losses to institutional investors due to failure to conduct 
diligence among contra-parties who operate on the level of mutual 
trust. 271 In these instances, the party from whom a make-whole 
payment-or "restitution"-is sought, is thought to so value the 
relationship that it would be reluctant to favor its perceived short-
tenn advantage over the long-tenn consequences of litigation, 
269. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.c. §§ 78m(a), 78o(d) (2006». 
270. See Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation: Retailization, Regulation, and Investor 
Suitability, 28 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 581,593 (2009). 
271. For example, notwithstanding the potential for inaccurate hedge fund valuations 
(including the inherent risk that managers may misprice fund units), qualified 
investors and fund managers can avail themselves of "informal rules and business 
practices" that place a premium on maintaining relationships and protecting business 
practices. Id. at 624-25. Even with patent conflicts between the parties, the informal 
"course of dealing" rules are not a novel response to disputes with certain capital 
markets participants, but also predated the Securities Act. In his testimony before the 
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Mr. J.P. Morgan described his firm's 
business strategy: 
MR. PECORA. But the interests of your firm would be best 
served by doing the financing in the safest possible way and for 
the greatest amount of profit or commission, would it not? 
MR. MORGAN. No; it should not. Certainly not. You seem 
to think we do not want to go on doing business. We do want to 
go on doing business. 
MR. PECORA. You want to go on doing business profitable 
to yourselves? 
MR. MORGAN. Not only profitable to ourselves, but you 
cannot go on with any good business that only one side makes any 
money on. 
Stock Exchange Practices: Hearing on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 56 Before the S. Comm. 
on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., pt. 1, 57 (1933) [hereinafter Pecora Committee 
Hearings]. Nonetheless, because of its expertise in business matters, the sophisticated 
investor's "duty to investigate the facts surrounding a securities transaction" exceeds 
that of the "novice." C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the 
Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1092 (Dec. 1988). 
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tarnished reputation, or-worse still-the loss of a significant 
business re1ationship.272 So in this sense, the choice of a 
sophisticated investor who substitutes trust for diligence may be 
rational; however, this investor also has to accept the financial risk 
that a relationship that seemed so stable may in a particular situation 
(e.g., market turmoil or the replacement of personnel who have a 
vested interest in the relationship) be viewed as expendable by its 
contra-party.273 Notwithstanding the desire to substitute trust for 
customary diligence of investment products and offerings, individual 
accredited investors, unlike sophisticated investors, may not have the 
same investment expertise or ability to withstand losses of investment 
principal or access to those "informal rules and business practices" 
favored by institutional investors. 274 
E. Accreditation as a Substitute for that "Special Relationship" 
To what extent is accreditation a proper substitute for that special 
relationship with-or special knowledge of-the issuer that marks 
the sophisticated investor? Although the safe harbor of Rule 506 
permits issuers-or promoters-to qualify those investors who may 
participate in private offerings, the accredited investor-whether 
acting individually or with the assistance of a purchaser 
representative-mayor may not be sophisticated, particularly if the 
investor is not an angel investor,275 venture capitalist, controlling 
shareholder, director or officer of the issuer, or if the investor lacks 
the leverage and capacity to bargain for access to information the 
investor deems relevant concerning the investment and the capacity 
to evaluate that information. 276 
272. See Kaal, supra note 270, at 624-25. 
273. Id.; Henry Jarecki & Jason Ungar, Doing Your Due Diligence, FUTURES, July 2009, at 
38,39,42. 
274. Kaal, supra note 270, at 624-25. 
275. The angel investor typically is a wealthy individual who finances new business 
ventures by providing additional seed and start-up capital to the entity. Darian M. 
Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 V AND. L. REV. 1405, 
1406 (2008); Eugene Choo, Going Dutch: The Google lPO, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.1. 
405, 409 (2005). In contrast, the venture capitalist provides financing at a later stage 
of the entity's development. Id. 
276. See Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt., 545 F.2d 893, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that the 
issuer's reliance on an offeree's investment sophistication depends on whether the 
offeree "could have been expected to ask the right questions and seek out the relevant 
information"); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Conn. 1969) ("No 
investor can be said to be sophisticated per se; he can only fend for himself when he 
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By comparison, investors in putative private offerings in the period 
prior to enactment of the Securities Act may not have been 
"financially sophisticated" either. 277 Many investment bankers 
maintained lists of preferred investors for private offerings of 
common stock during the boom years of 1928 and 1929,278 which 
typically included "officers and directors of banks, trust companies, 
insurance companies and other great financial institutions, executives 
of railroads, utilities, and industrial corporations, editors, lawyers, 
politicians, and public officials.,,279 For example, J.P. Morgan & Co. 
purchased securities issued by the United Corporation, Alleghany 
Corporation, Standard Brands, Johns-Manville Corporation, and 
Niagara-Hudson Power Corporation, and distributed a portion of 
those securities to "influential" investors on Morgan's preferred 
lists,280 which included persons who held "prominent governmental, 
political, and corporate positions.,,281 
Mr. George Whitney, a J.P. Morgan partner, described the purpose 
of the "preferred" lists as a means for Morgan to share the risks of 
equity securities distributions with other "underwriters,,,282 a method 
has personal knowledge of or has access to the kind of information which a 
registration statement would disclose."). 
277. See infra note 278 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 280-90 and 
accompanying text. 
278. Pecora Committee Hearings, supra note 271, pt. 2, at 401 (statement of Mr. George 
Whitney, J.P. Morgan & Co.) ("[T]here [had] been minor instances and very few 
opportunities to finance corporations by stock issuances prior to 1927."). 
279. COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REp. No. 73-
1455, at 110 (1934), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/sensep 
/issue/3912/download/59691/19330606 _ sensep _ rpt.pdf 
280. Jd. at 101, 106-07 (stating that Drexel & Co., Kuhn, Loeb & Co., and National City 
Co. maintained similar lists for securities distributions). Pecora Committee Hearings, 
supra note 271, at 855 (statement of George Whitney, J.P. Morgan & Co.) ("[T]hose 
who were on the preferred list were either wealthy and in the investing class or ... 
they were friends of the House of Morgan or its representatives."). 
281. S. REp. No. 73-1455, at 101; see generally Pecora Committee Hearings, supra note 
271 (testimony describing the buying and selling of securities). In one transaction, 
Morgan acquired Alleghany Corporation common stock for $20 per share, and sold a 
portion of the shares to its preferred list purchasers at its cost-i.e., $20 per share. S. 
REp. No. 73-1455, at 10 1. Morgan's preferred list purchasers of the Alleghany stock 
included the Chairman of the National Democratic Committee, Treasurer of the 
Republican National Committee, Secretary of the Navy, Speaker of the New York 
State Assembly and State Chairman of the Republican Party, President of the United 
States Chamber of Commerce, President of the American Bar Association, and 
President of American Car & Foundry Co., and later Secretary of the Treasury. Jd. at 
102. 
282. Pecora Committee Hearings, supra note 271, at 396-97 (statement of George 
Whitney, J.P. Morgan & Co.) ("But we did believe that we knew certain people who 
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of using individuals to distribute securities that historically developed 
in London. 283 While these transactions nominally were effected as 
private placements, they seemed to transform into de facto public 
offerings. 284 Investment bankers and the investors on the preferred 
lists profited handsomely from the resales of their securities to public 
investors at prices that reflected the "intense public interest" 
generated by the "considerable publicity" surrounding these private 
placements. 285 
Preferred-list participants exemplified the type of investors who 
could fend for themselves in securities distributions prior to adoption 
of the Securities Act. 286 The preferred-list participants mayor may 
not have been financially sophisticated, but their investment banking 
"sponsors" had incentives not to place their "preferred" investors in 
had the substantial wealth, the knowledge of their securities, and the willingness to 
take a risk along with us in the underwriting of these common stocks."). Mr. John 
Pierpoint Morgan stated that his firm's principal securities business was dealing in 
bonds, not common stock. fd. at 879 (statement of J.P. Morgan, head of J.P. Morgan 
& Co.). Thus, consistent with its focus on "dealing in investment securities of 
established character," Morgan limited its common stock offerings to "individuals 
capable of sharing and understanding the risks," thereby avoiding common stock 
distributions to the general public, which were likely to occur if Morgan had invited 
other banks and dealers to participate in the distribution. /d. at 880 (statement of J.P. 
Morgan, head of J.P. Morgan & Co.). 
283. fd. at 401 (statement of George Whitney, J.P. Morgan & Co.) ("They take a risk of 
profit; they take a risk of loss. In either event we believe that they are competent to 
take the risk, in whichever form it may be, based upon their knowledge and their own 
opinion and their own judgment."). 
284. See S. REp. No. 73-1455, at 101. 
285. Id. As a result of the immense publicity, "market levels materially above the price of 
the original offering were quickly established." Id. 
286. See supra notes 280-81 and accompanying text. According to Lewis Corey's The 
House of Morgan, it was estimated that J.P. Morgan "influence[d] about 
$74,000,000,000 of corporate wealth" through interlocking directorates (representing 
about one quarter of the nation's corporate assets). Pecora Committee Hearings, 
supra note 271, at 847 (statement of Sen. Edward P. Costigan). The Senate 
committee focused, in part, on banks that used preferred lists and interlocking 
directorates to enhance their influence over corporate wealth, and the resulting failure 
of recipients of those favors (i.e., corporate officers and public officials) to exercise 
their responsibilities to their institutions or the public, respectively. See S. REp. No. 
73-1455, at 110. Although the Pecora Commission Report noted the pervasive 
presence of interlocking directorships and viewed those relationships as adverse to the 
public interest, the power of board members may have been overstated. Thomas K. 
McCraw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 114 (1984) ("Interlocking directorates often 
reflected the insensitivity and power of top corporate managers (who selected most 
board members themselves) more than it did the power of the bankers, lawyers, and 
outside businessmen who sat on boards."). 
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unprofitable (or losing) investments. 287 In his response to Senator 
James Couzens's assertion that J.P. Morgan & Co. gave favorable 
prices to investors on the preferred list "so that they would 
reciprocate and keep on good terms,,,288 Mr. Whitney ultimately 
conceded that he had "denied perhaps too vehemently. . . that we 
expected to get direct consideration.,,289 Thus, while some of the 
preferred-list participants likely were merely "friends" of bankers at a 
particular investment banking firm-rather than captains of finance 
or industry-they probably had a high degree of confidence that their 
investment-banking sponsors would take care of them. 290 With their 
natural advantage relative to ordinary public investors291 and the need 
for the investment bankers to maintain favorable business or personal 
relationships, preferred-list investors certainly could fend for 
themselves. Thus, by virtue of their placement on preferred lists 
maintained by their investment-banking sponsors, these preferred-list 
investors undoubtedly enjoyed a special relationship.292 When 
individual investors who qualify as accredited investors for Rule 506 
private offerings lack substantial wealth, knowledge of investments, 
and understanding of-as well as the ability to share-the risks of the 
private offering, it is questionable whether accreditation is an 
appropriate substitute for that special relationship that historically 
marked the private-offering exemption afforded by Section 4(2).293 
287. See S. REp. No. 73-1455, at 109-10 (asserting that "preferred lists" were among the 
means that investment bankers used to "extend their influence and control over" 
persons who were prominent in finance, industry, and politics). 
288. ld. at 105-06 (stating that according to Senator Couzens, "direct consideration" from 
preferred list investors included "making deposits with your concern, ... giving you 
their underwritings, and the opportunity to sell their securities"). 
289. ld. at 106. Mr. Otto H. Kahn testified that Kuhn, Loeb used its preferred lists to 
"maintain the good will of individuals upon whom [it] relied for advice in financial 
matters," although he acknowledged that his firm ordinarily did not follow that 
advice. Jd. 
290. ld. at 205-07. 
291. After enactment of the Securities Act, the ability to conduct stealth public offerings 
was substantially diminished as a result of the requirement to register offerings made 
by means of the mails or any instrumentality of interstate commerce (unless the 
transaction or securities met specified exemptions), and comply with disclosure 
mandates for the offering prospectus. See 15 U.S.c. §§ 77(e), 77(j) (2006). Given the 
perspective that preferred list participants essentially were helping to underwrite 
securities offerings, Section 4(1) precluded resales of securities acquired in a private 
offering by an issuer, underwriter, or dealer. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(I). 
292. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
293. See supra text accompanying notes 275-91. 
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F. Many Individual Investors Favored the Status Quo 
More recently, the Commission sought to address the 
appropriateness of continuing to rely on largely unchanged income 
and net-worth financial tests for individuals seeking to invest in 
private offerings of hedge funds and similar pooled investment 
vehicles. 294 Noting that the standards originally adopted in the early 
1980s served as an objective gauge for identifying that class of 
individual investors who were capable of evaluating and bearing 
investment risks of private offerings, the Commission observed that 
those standards may no longer meet their intended purpose, 
particularly given the effects of inflation, the "sustained growth in 
wealth and income of the 1990s," and the appreciation in home 
values-all of which have contributed to a substantial increase in the 
number of accredited investors. 295 The Commission questioned the 
ability of this expanded class of accredited investors to understand 
the complexity and risks of privately offered pooled investment 
vehicles, including the lack of publicly available information about 
the investment, undisclosed conflicting interests, complex fee 
arrangements, and higher risk structure. 296 
294. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, Securities 
Act Release No. 33-8766, [2006--2007 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 
87,736 (Dec. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Release No. 33-8766], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2006/33-8766.pdf; see also Wallis K. Finger, 
Note, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC's "Accredited Investor" 
Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. Rev. 733, 733 (2009) (noting the 
anomaly that wealthy heiress Paris Hilton who has no discernible financial expertise 
qualifies as an accredited investor but a Harvard MBA alumna with a Ph.D. in 
financial systems analysis cannot qualifY because she does not meet the minimum 
income or net-worth tests). 
295. Release No. 33-8766, supra note 294, at 84,047. 
296. Jd. The Commission sought to align the investor protections for offerings made under 
Section 3(c)(l) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 with those already available 
for offerings made under Section 3(c)(7) of the Company Act, which also require that 
each individual accredited investor own at least $5 million of investments upon his 
original investment in the pool. 1d.; see also Edward Siedle, Wealthy Still Suckers for 
Madoff-Style Scams, FORBES, Mar. 17, 2010 12:00 PM, http://forbes.com! 
20101031 17 Imadoff-wealthy-investors-personal-finance-affinity- fraud.html (stating 
that wealthy investors should seek money managers who will discuss "questions about 
manager compensation, fiduciary duty, conflicts of interest, custody of assets, hidden 
financial arrangements, pay-to-play, performance reporting and discrepancies, 
auditing practices, transparency and regulatory loopholes. Many wealthy investors 
haven't a clue about how insidious these issues can become if not dealt with head-
on."). 
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The Commission initially proposed new Rule 509 of Regulation D, 
which would add a new category of accredited investor: the 
accredited natural person. 297 This new category of the accredited 
investor was intended "to help ensure that investors in [hedge funds 
and similar pooled investment vehicles]298 are capable of evaluating 
and bearing the risks of their investments.,,299 As proposed, an 
accredited natural person must meet the income or net worth test of 
Rule 501(a), as well as own a minimum of $2.5 million in specified 
categories of investments300 at the time of his initial investment in the 
pooled investment vehicle. 301 The "investments-owned" test may be 
satisfied individually or in the aggregate with the investor's spouse, 
and the dollar amount would be subject to periodic adjustments to 
reflect inflation. 302 
The release largely attracted comments in opposition to the 
proposed accredited natural person definition, although some persons 
supported the revisions. 303 Of those individuals who objected to the 
297. Release No. 33-8766, supra note 294, at 84,047--48. 
298. The Commission did not propose to include venture-capital funds within the ambit of 
the revisions. Id. at 84,05l. 
299. Id. at 84,042. The Commission acknowledged that the goal of its accredited natural 
person standard would be met if the individual were able to hire a professional advisor 
who had the requisite expertise "to evaluate the merits and risks of a prospective 
investment." Id. at 84,048. 
300. Id. at 84,048. The Commission did not view increases in personal wealth due to 
appreciation in the valuation of real estate used by an individual (or certain family 
members) as a personal residence, or as a place of business, or in connection with a 
trade or business as indicative of the individual's investment "knowledge and 
financial sophistication." Accordingly, those assets were proposed to be excluded 
under the investments-owned test. Id. at 84,051. 
301. Id. at 84,048. Proposed Rule 216 would have made similar changes to the definition 
of accredited investors for purposes of offerings of private-investment vehicles under 
Section 4(6) of the Securities Act. Solely for purposes of proposed Rule 509(a), an 
issuer can comply with the requirement if it "reasonably believes" that the individual 
satisfies the accredited natural person standard. Id. at 84,047--48. 
302. Id. at 84,048. Over 600 comments on the proposals were filed with the Commission. 
Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release 
No. 8828, [2007 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 87,939, 85,174 (Aug. 3, 
2007). 
303. See Comments of James R. Sweeney, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 26, 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/jrsweeney5331.htm ("[T]he proposed legislation .. 
. could save many inexperienced and trusting investors many millions of dollars."); 
Comments of Kevin J. Koons, SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N (Jan. 28, 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/kjkoons3586.htm ("Experience and sophistication 
should require lower levels of protection such as a total net worth of at least 
$1,500,000. Lack of experience and sophistication should require higher levels of 
protection such as a total net worth of at least $3,000,000."); Comments of Poor But 
Educated, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 29, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-
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proposals, they tended to consider the revisions an infringement on 
personal liberty and freedom of contract, and sought to retain for 
themselves the autonomy to choose to participate in privately offered 
hedge funds and similar vehicles without further regulatory 
hindrance. 304 Still others questioned the premise that linked 
numerical standards, such as net worth, as a valid proxy for financial 
acumen 305 and viewed the proposals as favoring the wealthy. 306 
06/peducated5730.htm (supporting an examination requirement to establish the 
requisite financial sophistication for those who would not meet the proposed 
investments-owned test); Comments of Gary R. Greenbaum, CFA, CAIA, SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM'N (Feb. I, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/ 
grgreenbaum5173.htm (suggesting an exemption "from the proposed $2.5 million 
asset requirement" for those individual accredited investors who also have a personal 
financial plan, and have engaged a professional advisor who adheres to fiduciary 
standards and holds recognized investment credentials (e.g., CF A designation)). 
304. See Comments of William Tarallo, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 4, 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/wtarall03592.htm ("[A]n effort to disenfranchise 
the INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR [sic] from the fruits and influence of modem 
finance"); Comments of Janell C. Rhee, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 9, 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/s72506.shtml (An "educated hedge fund investor" 
who would not meet the new accreditation standard expressed "alarm[], concern[] and 
[anger] that [the Commission] consider[ed] [her] too ignorant [and] uneducated" to 
invest in pooled investment vehicles); Comments of Michael E. Guerra, MD., SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 26, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/meguerra4152.htm 
("It is paternalistic and immoral for government to prohibit freely entered into 
transactions . . . . Net worth is not determinant of critical thinking and keen 
analysis."); Comments of Maco Stewart, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 26. 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/s72506-20.htm ("Please consider the millions of us 
who understand what we invest in but are not rich. Discriminating against us is not 
right and is not in the public interest."); Comments of Robert Moore, SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM'N (Jan. 26, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/rrnoore5020.htm 
("Shouldn't I be free to lose all my money ifI'm wrong or make lots of money ifI'm 
right? . " Whether I win or lose it's not the responsibility of government to protect 
me from my own stupidity; nor is it the responsibility of government to bail-me-out if 
I make a bad decision."); Comments of Darrell Black, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 26, 
2007), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/s72506-77.htm ("With the taxes a person 
has to pay today having an AGI of only $200,000.00, you can't really put much away 
anymore. I pay in excess of $70,000 per year in taxes. So, give us smaller net worth 
individuals an opportunity to 'grow.' We know the risks!"); Comments of Robert 
Durden, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 29, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-
06lrdurden3735.htm ("Similar to most government interference designed to 'provide 
additional investor protections', this proposed rule change is misguided and based on 
the false assumption that rational, self-interested adults are less capable of 
determining their financial well-being than a government committee."). 
305. See Comments of Craig A. Matson, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 18, 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/s72506-14.htm (asserting that from his vantage 
point as a proprietary trader who is not an accredited investor, there is "no relationship 
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Several months later, the Commission proposed to update the 
definition of accredited investor307 and to create the new category of 
between net worth and financial savvy," given the experience of wealthy institutional 
and individual investors in the "Long Term Capital Management and Amaranth 
debacles"); Comments of Daniel L. Gastel, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 27, 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/dlgasteI9430.htm ("There are many people 
sophisticated enough to understand the risks who do not meet the criterion, who have 
chosen to become teachers or social workers or something that doesn't pay well."); 
Comments of Sebastian Good, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 27, 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/sgood5517.htm ("Money can be achieved by work, 
by luck, by theft and any number of other measures. It does not always imply 
competence."); Comments of Jack P. McCormick, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 28, 
2007), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/jpmccormickI550.htm (suggesting a gradual 
increase in the net worth requirement with upward adjustments based on experience 
"over a representative period"); Comments of Alan M Gordon, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N 
(Jan. 31, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/amgordon4206.htm ("Due 
diligence is more important to success than just having had the moeny [sic] to invest 
in the first place; many wealthy people lose money all the time by investing in ideas 
that they have not checked out."). 
306. See Comments of Ross G. Kaminsky, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Dec. 30, 2006), 
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/rgkaminsky5279.htm ("The current accredited 
investor rules are already more than enough to ensure that the rich get richer and the 
rest have far fewer opportunities to catch up."); Comments of Kevin Hoffmeyer, SEC. 
& EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 17, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-
06/khoffmeyer9241.htm (stating that the proposed revision "will only help to 
perpetuate the wealth gap that exists in this country"); Comments of Thomas Hardy, 
Adjunct Professor of Finance, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 26, 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/thardy8631.htm ("As there tends to be a correlation 
between risk and return, in allowing only the wealthy to make certain higher-risk 
investments, you further increase the disparity between the wealthy and the middle 
class."); Comments of Bruce H. Wilson, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 26, 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/bhwilson7477.htm ("But let the public decide 
where they want to put their money without the artificial guidelines that eliminate 
99% of the investing public based on criteria that allows only the super rich to avoid 
the 'buy and hope' mentality that is so common in relative return programs."); 
Comments of Dr. Lanny Herron, Professor of Management, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N 
(Jan. 28, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/lherron9362.htm ("I can think of 
no one who benefits from such rules other than certain parties who wish to stifle 
competition."); Comments of Tony Jackson, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 28, 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/tjackson6772.htm ("I believe the explosion of 
investing information that is now available has increased the sophistication of 
investors everywhere."); Comments of William Duffy, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 28, 
2007), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/wduffy5856.htm ("The focus of future 
regulation should be to make sure there is an honest game on an even playing field, 
not to exclude certain classes of citizens. "). 
307. The Commission proposed an investments-owned test of $750,000 as an alternative to 
the current net-worth test, adjusted periodically for inflation. Revisions of Limited 
Offering Exemptions in Regulation 0, Securities Act Release No. 8828 [2007 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 87,939, at 85,181-82 (Aug. 3, 2007). 
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large accredited investor308 as part of its efforts to modernize the 
private- and limited-offering exemption rules of Regulation D while 
ensuring that the investors could fend for themselves, and thereby 
obviating any need for registration of the transaction. 309 Unlike the 
comments to the earlier rulemaking proposal, which seemed to be 
dominated by individual investors, these proposals drew far fewer 
comment letters. 3\0 The Commission did not enact any of the 
proposed revisions to its accredited investor standards and announced 
in December 2009 that it had withdrawn the revisions it proposed in 
August 2007.311 
Legislation was subsequently enacted to address the net-worth test 
for individuals. 312 Section 413(a) directed the Commission to 
exclude the natural person's primary residence from the calculation 
of net worth for the initial four-year period following enactment of 
the Dodd-Frank Act. 313 The Commission was authorized to conduct 
a review of the accredited investor definition applicable to 
individuals314 and adjust the definition "as the Commission may 
deem appropriate for the protection of investors, in the public 
interest, and in light of the economy.,,315 Section 413(b)(2) directed 
the Commission to review periodically the accredited investor 
However, the proposed investments-owned test excluded the value of real estate assets 
used as personal residences or places of business. This exclusion reflected the 
Commission's judgment that allowing only assets held for investment would provide 
a better measure of "an investor's need for the protections of registration under the 
Securities Act." Id. at 34. Notably, unlike the proposed accredited natural person 
standard, the imposition of the investments-owned test would not result in any 
significant change in the number of individual investors who could qualify as 
accredited investors. Id. at n.90. 
308. Id. at 85,174. 
309. Id. at 85,171. The Commission also solicited further comment on its proposed 
accredited natural person definition. Id. at 85,181. 
310. See generally Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-07/s71807.shtml (last visited 
Jan. 6,2011) (Public Comment File). 
311. Regulatory Flexibility Agenda, Release No. 33-9082, 74 Fed. Reg. 64576, Item 581 
(Dec. 7, 2009). 
312. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 413,124 Stat. 1376, 1577-78 (2010). 
313. § 413, 124 Stat. at 1577; see also Question 179.01, subsection in Compliance & 
Disclosure 1nterpretations / Security Act Rules, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 
http://sec.gov/divisions/corpfiniguidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm (interpretation 
of Section 413(a)). 
314. § 413(b)(l)(A), 124 Stat. at 1577-78. 
315. § 413(b)(1)(8), 124 Stat. at 1578. 
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definition and make appropriate adjustments. 316 Within three years 
after enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Comptroller General 
must study the criteria necessary to qualify as accredited investors 
and to invest in private funds, and file its report with the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, and the House 
Committee on Financial Services. 317 Finally, Section 418 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act requires the Commission within one year after 
enactment (and on a five-year cycle thereafter) to adjust for inflation 
any dollar-amount test for the qualified client standard of Section 
205(e) of the Advisers ACt. 318 
Although some individuals opposed the higher thresholds for the 
accredited natural person definition, they urged the Commission to 
impose periodic disclosure obligations on pooled investment 
vehicles. 319 The point of the registration exemption, however, is that 
(a) the investors can-without direct government intervention-
induce the issuer to furnish the disclosure (or transparency) that the 
investors require as a condition of their investment, or (b) lacking this 
ability, the investors understand and accept the risk of investing in an 
issuer that is not subject to reporting obligations comparable to those 
imposed on publicly held companies. 320 This dichotomy illustrates a 
misunderstanding of "accreditation." On one hand, individual 
investors who satisfy the minimum financial thresholds (i.e., net 
316. § 413(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1578. 
317. § 415,124 Stat. at 1578 (GAO Study). 
318. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(e) (2010); § 418,124 Stat. at 1579. 
319. See Comments of Peter Clark, Ph.D., SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N (Feb. 9, 2007), 
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/pclark6245.htm ("find innovative approaches to 
increase hedge fund transparency"); Comments of jeffrey E. Kahler, CPA, SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM'N (Feb. 12, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/jekahler6095.htm 
("raise the standard for disclosure"); Comments of Kimberly 1. Wilson, SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM'N (Feb. 13, 2007), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06Ikjwilson6168.htm 
("require full financial disclosure on the people running the programs with monthly 
financial reporting"). The Dodd-Frank Act imposes registration generally on certain 
advisers to private funds (but not on advisers to venture capital funds), but much of 
the transparency resulting from information required to be made available to the 
Commission, and the Financial Stability Oversight Council may not necessarily be 
made public if the information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of 
Information Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006); Restoring Financial Stability Act of 
2010 § 404(b)(I), (b)(3)-(b)(IO), 124 Stat. 1573-74; Pub. L. No. 111-257, 124 Stat. 
2646-47 (2010) (striking provisions of § 929I(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act that might 
have the effect of expanding exemptions from public disclosure); see also 156 Congo 
Rec. S7298 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2010) (Statement of Mr. Leahy) ("When Congress 
enacted the FOIA exemptions in section 9291, we sought to ensure that the SEC had 
access to the information that the Commission needed to protect American 
investors-not to shield information from the public."). 
320. Release No. 33-8766, supra note 294, at 84,046. 
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worth or income) but who are not wealthy should be allowed to 
participate in private offerings because they understand what they are 
doing and can pay "the price of admission." They can fend for 
themselves. But on the other hand, these same smaller individual 
investors have no practical way to obtain desired issuer disclosures 
on a going-forward basis without the considerable weight of the 
Commission's authority. They cannot fend for themselves. 321 
V. LOOKING FORWARD 
There remains a justification for allowing issuers to raise capital in 
private transactions with investors who are capable of conducting 
business in private markets. 322 The private-offering exemption 
provides issuers flexibility to access that class of investors who are 
least likely to (a) be impaired by information asymmetry,323 or (b) 
become a burden on the public fisc if they suffer unfavorable 
economic outcomes or total loss of investment principal (i.e., as their 
gains are private, any losses remain private and are not transformed 
into obligations borne generally by taxpayers). 324 Those sophisticated 
investors who choose not to perform diligence, or do not insist on 
continuing disclosure over the life of their investment but nonetheless 
invest in the offering, should be left to the outcomes-whether 
positive or negative--of their investment decisions. Thus, even when 
sophisticated investors seemingly fail to exercise critical judgment in 
the conduct of their pre- and post-transaction diligence or lack vigor 
in exercising their bargaining strength vis-a-vis the issuer, not only is 
there no practical need for registration, the public benefits of 
registration remain too remote. 
It is very doubtful that individual investors in public offerings 
actually read the statutory prospectus prior to making any investment 
32l. See supra Part I.B. (discussing the impact of the Madoff-Ponzi scheme on the 
"average American"). 
322. See Marc I. Steinberg and Emmanuel U. Obi, Examining the Pipeline: A 
Contemporary Assessment of Private Investments in Public Equity ("PIPEs"), 11 U. 
PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. I, 11 (2008) ("Depending on the circumstances, invocation ofa 
particular exemption may enable an issuer to raise the requisite capital while avoiding 
the costs generally attributable to public offerings."); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., 
Relaxing The Ban: It's Time To Allow General Solicitation And Advertising In Exempt 
Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2004) ("[A]ngel investors contribute not 
only capital but also business experience, which many entrepreneurs consider to be 
just as valuable as the capital [investment]."); Ibrahim, supra note 275, at 1406-07 
(noting that many entrepreneurs rely on financing from angels). 
323. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
324. See Langevoort, supra note 195. 
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decision. 325 Although these individual investors may fail to practice 
pre-purchase due diligence, at least investment professionals who 
bring public deals to market have an incentive to conduct due 
diligence,326 and public investors benefit from their diligence. 
Moreover, for at least the first year, the issuer also would be required 
to comply with Securities Act reporting obligations. 327 Thus, the 
ability to fend for themselves should be measured not only by the 
individual accredited investors' capability to conduct pre-investment 
due diligence and negotiate offering terms, but also their ability to 
negotiate on-going issuer disclosure in markets that are not 
comparable to the public-company disclosure regime. 
Beacon Advisors estimated the size of the mass affluent market at 
$6 trillion, which generally means these individuals have $100,000 to 
$1 million in assets-excluding real estate-available for 
investment. 328 Although about 54.5 million~r 47%-of U.S. 
households own equities or bonds,329 comments on the Commission's 
proposal to adjust the qualifications for accredited investors suggest 
an intense desire by individual investors to continue to have 
opportunities to participate in privately offered securities. 330 These 
investors want to make choices about investment vehicles and 
325. Indeed, the Securities Act does not require that investors have read the registration 
statement in order to manifest reliance when seeking damages for untrue statements or 
omissions that meet the materiality standard. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.c. § 
77k(a) (2006). 
326. Underwriters may assert a due diligence defense to liability. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)--
(c). 
327. IS U.S.C. § 7So(d)(2006). 
32S. Glenn Rifkin, Financial Advice for the 'Mass Affluent', N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6,2006, at 
C7, available at http://www.nytimes.coml2006/04/06lbusiness/06sbiz.html?_r= 1 & 
pagewanted=print. It is likely that the mass affluent market includes individuals who 
currently meet the individual accredited investor standard. 
329. INV. Co. INST. & SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS. ASS'N., EQUITY AND BOND OWNERSHIP 
IN AMERICA, 200S, at 7 (200S) (showing figures which represent a decline of 7.4 
million since 2001). This report measured ownership of individual stocks and bonds, 
stock and bond mutual funds, hybrid mutual funds, exchange-traded funds, and 
variable annuities. Id. 
330. See generally Comments on Proposed Rule: Prohibition of Fraud by Advisors to 
Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private 
Investment Vehicles, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://sec.gov/comments/s7-2S-
06/s72506.shtml (last visited Jan. 06, 2011). Although the Commission ultimately 
declined to act on these proposals, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the Commission to 
adjust the net worth standards for individual accredited investors, excluding the value 
of the investor's residence (for the first four years). Dodd-Frank Act, § 413, 124 Stat. 
at 1577; see also Dodd-Frank Act, § 415, 124 Stat. at 1578 (GAO Study). By 
contrast, the GAO Study would address "accredited investor status and eligibility to 
invest in private funds." Dodd-Frank Act § 415, 124 Stat. 1578. 
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allocation of personal investment resources rather than have 
regulators make those choices for them. After all, it is not clear that 
regulators, however well-intentioned, do not have similar biases that 
affect their decision-making. 331 
However, in light of statements submitted to Judge Chin by a 
number of Madoffs individual accredited investors, and views 
expressed by some of the individuals commenting on the 
Commission's accredited natural person proposal,332 there should be 
systematic efforts to identify which categories of investors to whom 
Rule 506 offerings currently may be made actually can fend for 
themselves throughout the life of the particular private-offering 
investment. Since its adoption in 1982, there should be sufficient 
offerings that would enable researchers to conduct a thorough 
examination of how Rule 506 is used from the viewpoint of all 
participants in the offering process: Issuers, individual and 
institutional investors, placement agents, and purchaser 
representatives. 333 Regulation D offerings should be scrutinized so 
that we understand the nature of the investors and the type of risk 
these investors have incurred. What is the nature of diligence on the 
offering conducted by placement agents, individual accredited 
investors, and purchaser representatives? In examining methods 
adopted by individual accredited investors, to what extent do they 
rely on professional advisors in identifying investment opportunities 
331. See THOMAS SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS: A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO THE ECONOMY 
74-75 (3d ed. 2007) ("The mechanisms of the market are impersonal but the choices 
made by individuals are as personal as choices made anywhere else . . .. The real 
contrast is between choices made by individuals for themselves and choices made for 
them by others who presume to define what these individuals 'really' need."); Richard 
A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 
1551, 1575 (1998) ("The expert, too, is behavioral man. Behavioral man behaves in 
unpredictable ways. Dare we vest responsibility for curing irrationality in the 
irrational?"). 
332. See supra notes 58, 66-72, 303-06 and accompanying text. 
333. Since registered brokers or dealers are required to maintain books and records for a 
minimum of three years and are subject to regulation by the Commission, their data 
should provide a significant sample from which to conduct research on a variety of 
offerings in a widely dispersed geographic area. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 to a-4 
(2010). In addition to public hearings, the Commission also should seek to elicit data 
directly from individual investors who participate in Rule 506 offerings and issuers 
who use the exemption in their capital raising activities. Unlike registered brokers or 
dealers, none of these persons are subject to regulation by the Commission; 
nonetheless, it would be important to consider the experiences of issuers and investors 
as part of the general examination of the Rule, and efforts should be made to 
encourage their participation (e.g., staff conducting hearings on a regional basis). 
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or making investment decisions? Do their respective purchaser 
representatives have expertise in the product or strategy that is the 
subject of the private offering? How are their purchaser 
representatives selected? Are their respective purchaser 
representatives compensated solely by the relevant accredited 
investor, or are the purchaser representatives relying on disclosure of 
their conflicts to their investor clientele?334 What percentage of 
purchaser representatives work exclusively for their principal, the 
accredited investor, and have a compensation structure that is 
unrelated to particular transactions considered by their principal-
i.e., the purchaser representative's compensation is not linked to 
whether the principal invests in private offerings that are scrutinized 
by the purchaser representative? What means do issuers use to 
conduct diligence on potential investors? What written or other 
disclosure ordinarily is furnished by issuers? What sales or 
marketing materials-if any-do issuers use with potential investors 
and professional advisors, including those who are associated persons 
of registered broker-dealers? 
Do we forestall smaller affluent investors-those who meet the 
current minimum accredited investor thresholds-from investing in 
private placements because the investment is too risky for them? Do 
we continue to allow smaller affluent investors to determine the level 
of risk appropriate for their investment needs? How do we balance 
the interest of the smaller accredited investors to participate in private 
placements with those investors' "expectations" that the government 
is protecting them from the risk they have incurred? Are there 
significant risks associated with participation by the smaller 
accredited investor, or do these investors represent a de minimis 
segment of individual accredited investors? 
A thorough examination of Rule 506 offerings would enable the 
Commission to determine whether significant issues exist with the 
participation by individual accredited investors, particularly those 
who are at the lowest spectrum of the income and net-worth financial 
standards. 335 If those risks are determined to be untenable, the 
Commission would have an opportunity to develop more meaningful 
334. Ultimately, should the purchaser representative be required to have a specialist's 
designation, such as the Chartered Financial Analyst? For example, CF A may not 
engage in activities that would pose a conflict of interest with the client. Rather, the 
CF A must "[p ]Iace the integrity of the profession and the interests of clients above 
[his] own personal interests." Code of Ethics & Standards of Professional Conduct, 
CF A INST. (20 I 0), https://www.cfainstitute.orglethics/codes/ethics/Pageslindex.aspx. 
335. See supra Part II.C. 
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standards for isolating participation in Rule 506 offerings to those 
individual investors who actually are able to fend for themselves. 
Finally, how might we address providing investment opportunities 
for the smaller affluent investor who is not yet an accredited 
investor? Perhaps it would be useful to develop a regulatory 
structure for capitalist incubators, which might enable this class of 
investors to gain the competency to participate in Rule 506 
offerings. 336 There are innumerable opportunities for entrepreneurs to 
develop their business models and receive expert support in 
executing their business plans,337 and the Commission's rules provide 
an exemption for raising seed capital. 338 Comparable structures 
orientated to the needs of the individual investor could help smaller 
investors develop the capability to pursue their ambition to become 
capitalists. 339 
Capitalist incubators would bring together angel investors, issuers, 
placement agents, and research analysts who specialize in industry 
segments of particular interest to program participants. 340 A key 
aspect of the capitalist incubator would be the opportunity for 
program participants to interact with other investors, entrepreneurs, 
and issuer representatives. Successful program participants could use 
their incubator experiences to substantiate their investment 
sophistication for purposes of future Rule 506 offerings. 
A capitalist incubator could be sponsored by a university, business 
school, research center, or state or regional economic development 
center. 341 As we approach Regulation D's thirtieth anniversary, this 
may be an opportune time for the Commission to conduct a 
comprehensive study of the operation of Rule 506. The program 
would be developed to meet individual objectives. Investor 
participants would receive instruction and guidance on various 
concepts, including identifying and managing risks of their portfolios, 
conducting due diligence, selecting investment advisors and 
336. See Duke K. Bristow et aI., Venture Capital Formation and Access: Lingering 
Impediments of the Investment Company Act of 1940,2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 77, 
116-17. 
337. Business Incubation FAQ, NAT'L Bus. INCUBATION ASS'N, http://www.nbia.org/ 
resource_library/faq/index.php#5 (last visited Jan. 6,2011). 
338. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2010). 
339. Comments on Proposed Rule: Prohibition of Fraud by Advisors to Certain Pooled 
Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, 
supra note 330. 
340. See Bristow et aI., supra note 336, at 116-17. 
341. These entities have experience sponsoring business incubators for early-stage 
companies. Business Incubation FAQ, supra note 337. 
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evaluating their performance, selecting accountants and legal 
counsel, and understanding the investors' personal investment 
decision-making biases. The investor would work on teams with 
experienced and other professionals to evaluate prospective private 
offerings. In addition to ethical formation (Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, insider trading, inculcating a culture of legal and regulatory 
compliance, etc.), the incubators would stress the investors' moral 
obligations underlying decisions to commit capital (i.e., accepting 
personal responsibility for one's investment decisions). The tools for 
managing risk and conducting diligence--on investments or financial 
or other professionals-could be developed as applications that can 
be run on smart phones, personal digital assistants, personal 
computers, or other social or electronic media. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The systemic failure of numerous Madoff investors, who arguably 
are sophisticated investors, to conduct due diligence may not be an 
isolated event. It illustrates the general failure of sophisticated 
investors to conduct due diligence on privately offered securities 
transactions-a problem that is not restricted to offerings of financial 
instruments or pooled investment vehicles, such as hedge funds, but 
can also exist with investments in "operating" companies. 342 
It is important to acknowledge that the private offering exemption 
continues to provide important benefits for the U.S. economy and 
poses insignificant risks when the class of investors is restricted to 
sophisticated investors. 343 It is not apparent that the accredited 
investor standard is a proper substitute for that special relationship or 
special knowledge of the issuer that marks the sophisticated 
investor. 344 As we approach Regulation D's thirtieth anniversary, this 
may be an opportune time for the Commission to conduct a 
comprehensive study of the operation of Rule 506. Conducting a 
study of the Rule would enable the Commission to determine what 
aspects of the Rule work well and what aspects may require 
refinement, particularly as to participation in private offerings by 
individual accredited investors. Ultimately, for us to realize the 
benefits of robust capital markets for our economy, we must enable 
all investors-including the affluent individual investor-to 
342. Susan Carey, Roots of $3 Billion Fraud Case Lie in DVD Players, Not CDOs, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 22, 2009, at Al (reporting that unlike Madoff, Tom Petters allegedly 
"gulled his victims with nonexistent DVD players and flat-screen TVs"). 
343. See supra notes 322-25 and accompanying text. 
344. Supra Part III.E. 
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participate in capital markets according to the particular investor's 
choice and tolerance for risk. The capitalist incubators could help 
develop skilled individual investors who may use the experience to 
qualify as accredited investors. 345 
We will not prevent investors from making improvident investment 
decisions because of their inordinate desire "not to miss out" on a hot 
investment or their greed. Thus, the focus of legislative and 
regulatory initiatives should not be to raise the expectations of the 
investing public that new laws or regulations can eliminate all 
vestiges of fraud, thereby relieving investors of any responsibility for 
the manner in which they conduct their investment activities 
(including due diligence) in private offerings. 
Rather, the focus should be on the following: (1) to militate against 
the potential devastation of the smaller ·investor-those capital 
market participants least able to fend for themselves or bear the risk 
of devastating financial loss, and (2) to shield taxpayers from 
effectively "underwriting" the risk of putative private investment 
activity. 
345. See supra text accompanying notes 328-32. 
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